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CRITIQUING MATTER OF A-B-: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN
ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS FOR WOMEN FLEEING INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE
Theresa A. Vogel*
ABSTRACT
The #MeToo movement has brought renewed attention to the impact of gender
inequality on our society’s ability to provide protection to women from physical
and sexual violence, including intimate partner violence. Despite advances in
legal protections and increased resources to prevent, prosecute, and bring an end
to intimate partner violence, in the absence of true efforts to combat gender
inequality as a whole, intimate partner violence will continue to pervade our
society. The discussion of gender inequality’s impact on the treatment of intimate
partner violence must expand beyond the violence that occurs in the United States
to gender inequality’s impact on the protection afforded to women who have
suffered this violence in other countries and seek protection from the United States.
This is because U.S. asylum law trails decades behind even our flawed federal and
state protections for victims of intimate partner violence. The male-centric lens
through which the refugee definition was drafted and is interpreted continues to
inhibit any progress in recognizing women’s asylum claims involving intimate
partner violence.
This Article finds that Matter of A-B- returns to the perception that intimate
partner violence is a personal matter outside the scope of asylum protections. The
decision demonstrates continued ignorance regarding the underlying reasons for
intimate partner violence against women—gender and subordination. The failure
to recognize that intimate partner violence occurs because of a woman’s gender is
one of the primary obstacles to improvements in the treatment of asylum claims
involving intimate partner violence. This Article contrasts the lack of progress in
U.S. asylum law to provide protection to women who suffer intimate partner
violence outside the United States with the advancements made in federal and
state efforts to combat intimate partner violence occurring inside the United States.
As a remedy, this Article recommends new legislation and regulations recognizing
and guiding adjudication of these asylum claims, combined with judicial training
and the development of a tracking mechanism for determinations in these types of
cases. The current commitment to eradicating gender inequality within the United
States is the perfect moment for reforming how we treat gender inequality when it
occurs outside the United States.

* Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law and Special Counsel
with the law firm of Hall & Evans, LLC. I want to thank Professor Tamara Kuennen and Professor Leah Wortham for their guidance in writing this Article and my husband for his support throughout the drafting process. I am also grateful for the work of the editors of the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform on this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In the era of #MeToo and #KeepFamiliesTogether, the momentum exists now for real reform to happen in United States asylum
law to protect victims seeking asylum due to gender-based violence.
The #MeToo movement spotlights the inequalities and sexual harassment and assault faced by women in our society; #KeepFamiliesTogether advocates for ending family separation and more
compassionate treatment for families who seek the safety and protections of our country. The American people reject a culture and
political agenda that perpetuate inequality, abuse, and violence
and demand that policymakers effect change. Despite this environment of enlightenment and reform, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a decision in Matter of A-B- that directly contradicts the
calls to protect victims of gender-based violence and those fleeing
to the United States for a safer life.
In June 2018, Sessions overturned an immigration judge’s decision to grant asylum status to a woman fleeing intimate partner vio1
lence. The Attorney General’s analysis regenerates the perception
that intimate partner violence is a personal, private matter outside
2
the scope of the “refugee” definition. The decision entirely ignores the importance of social and cultural views of gender and
subordination as the underlying reasons for the abuse and a coun-

1. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317, 346 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker,
No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
2. See id. at 316–46.
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try’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection. Legal scholars
recognize that intimate partner violence is inflicted by nongovernmental actors against women because of their gender, an
immutable characteristic forming a particular social group by it3
self. The abuser or non-governmental actor inflicts the abuse on
account of the belief that because the victim is a woman, she is,
4
therefore, subordinate.
The Attorney General also used this opportunity to overturn a
5
2014 precedent, Matter of A-R-C-G-. In that case, the United States
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recognized that a woman
from Guatemala who suffered intimate partner violence-related
persecution may meet the requirements for asylum. Specifically,
the BIA found that she was a member of the particular social
group comprised of “married women in Guatemala who are una6
ble to leave their relationship.” The decision appeared to demonstrate movement forward in these cases. The Attorney General’s
7
decision to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G- in Matter of A-B- quashed any
hope for fairer and more consistent determinations in asylum cases
involving intimate partner violence until new legislation or regulations are put in place to provide guidance.
There is a stark contrast between the protections afforded wom8
en who are victims of intimate partner violence in the United
States under U.S. federal and state law and the protections afforded women fleeing intimate partner violence in other countries un9
der U.S. asylum law. The #MeToo movement has breathed new
life into the discussion of physical and sexual violence against
women and the continued gender inequality that impedes adequate protections for women. Likewise, the #KeepFamiliesTogether trend forced the Trump Administration to retreat on a policy of

3. See, e.g., Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J.
2512, 2525 (2014); Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781–83 (2003).
4. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82; see also Marsden, supra note 3.
5. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316, 346.
6. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–94 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
7. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 346.
8. Since some adjudicators have taken an overly narrow interpretation of the term
“domestic violence,” particularly in regard to whether a relationship constitutes a “domestic”
relationship, this Article will use the term “intimate partner violence” wherever possible.
9. Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims
of Domestic Violence, 7 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 109, 111–12 (2013) (arguing that state and federal support for the eradication of domestic violence is now commonplace while the treatment of women who flee domestic violence at the U.S.–Mexico border face a justice system
that is fifty years behind due to its treatment of domestic violence as a private matter).
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treating families who seek the protections of our country inhumanely. The issue of asylees escaping intimate partner violence exists at the intersection of these two movements. True reform cannot be effected until policymakers develop a comprehensive
approach to protecting victims of intimate partner violence in the
United States regardless of whether the violence occurred in the
10
United States or in another country.
This Article uses Matter of A-B-, past U.S. asylum cases, and other
aspects of U.S. domestic violence law to call for a reform in U.S.
asylum law; namely, a congressional act and new regulations to reject the Attorney General’s ruling, recognize the viability of gender-based asylum claims involving intimate partner violence, and
provide guidance in their adjudication. Asylum claims by women
involving intimate partner violence should no longer be at the
mercy of the whims of an administration or the adjudicator. Accordingly, this Article argues that the barriers to asylum claims
based on intimate partner violence can be overcome only by (1)
providing new legislation and regulations definitively acknowledging that gender-based persecution is encompassed in the refugee
definition and guiding adjudication of these claims; (2) instituting
judicial training on gender-based asylum claims; and (3) developing a tracking mechanism on the adjudicative outcomes of asylum
claims based on gender.
Part I discusses the background of U.S. asylum law as it pertains
to gender-based asylum claims. Part II discusses Matter of A-B- and
its impact on asylum claims involving intimate partner violence.
Part III contrasts the lack of forward-thinking on the issue of intimate partner violence within the sea of reform that has occurred
outside of the asylum context in U.S. criminal and civil remedies

10. This Article focuses on male-perpetrated intimate partner violence against females.
Undoubtedly, females may perpetrate intimate partner violence on males and intimate
partner violence may occur between same-sex couples. However, the majority of intimate
partner violence perpetrated on the basis of one’s gender is male-on-female. See Rhonda
Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 291, 303 (1994) (noting that domestic violence is “overwhelmingly initiated by
men and inflicted upon women”); see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, pt. 1, ¶ 3, at 2, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Gender Guidelines] (“Gender-related
claims may be brought by either women or men, although due to particular types of persecution, they are more commonly brought by women.”); CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NCJ 197838, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME
DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (finding that eighty-five percent of victimizations by intimate partners in
the United States were against women).
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currently addressing intimate partner violence. Part IV suggests a
new framework incorporating the principles of these civil and
criminal reforms, as well as solutions to the primary barriers to asylum claims involving intimate partner violence, to provide guidance to adjudicators and consistency and predictability in the U.S.
approach.
I. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
A. The Structure of the U.S. Asylum Law System
The United States system governing immigration and asylum is
more convoluted than an ordinary judicial or executive system.
The U.S. immigration system as it exists today has its foundations
in the creation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
11
(INS). The INS was established in 1933 by executive order to ad12
minister and enforce federal immigration laws and regulations.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the INS Service and
13
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This reorganization resulted in the division of jurisdiction over asylum
claims between two agencies: DHS and the Department of Justice
14
(DOJ). Each agency has the power to promulgate asylum regulations, which are duplicated at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (DHS) and 8 C.F.R.
15
§ 1208 (DOJ). DHS oversees U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), where affirmative asylum claims are adjudicated,
and represents the government in removal cases, including those
before immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals
16
(BIA). The DOJ, through the Executive Office for Immigration

11. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS HISTORY OFFICE AND LIBRARY,
OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 7, 11 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf.
12. The INS was originally an agency of the Department of Labor but later reorganized
as an agency of the Department of Justice in 1940. Id. at 7–8.
13. Id. at 11.
14. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2548; see also Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (2009) (discussing the creation and reorganization of agencies
with jurisdiction over asylum and their regulations).
15. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2548; see also Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14.
16. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 100.1, 208.2, 1103.3, .4, .7 (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2009);
Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14 (2009).
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Review, oversees immigration courts and the BIA. 17 The Attorney
General appoints immigration judges to preside over immigration
18
court proceedings. In immigration court, an immigration judge
may adjudicate asylum claims denied by USCIS de novo or asylum
19
claims asserted in defense to removal.
The BIA is the highest administrative body, comprised of up to
twenty-one board members appointed by the Attorney General,
20
which interprets and applies immigration laws. In this capacity,
the BIA has jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of immigration judges, including asylum determinations, and must exercise
21
independent judgment in hearing those appeals. The BIA’s decisions are binding on immigration judges as well as officers of the
22
DHS. However, the Attorney General has the power to modify or
23
overrule decisions of the BIA through certification. The U.S. circuit courts may review BIA decisions as an administrative body as
well as the determinations of the Attorney General as an agency
24
head.
An asylum application may be made affirmatively with USCIS if
25
the person is not in removal proceedings. These cases are adjudicated by asylum officers within the USCIS. If a person is in removal
proceedings, she may file a defensive asylum application with the
26
immigration court in removal proceedings. An asylum applicant
17. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14, 1003.0 (2018); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14; see also About
the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last updated
Aug. 14, 2018).
18. Immigration Judge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
tools/glossary/immigration-judge (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
19. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2548.
20. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2018).
24. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 230 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing National Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
25. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylumunited-states (last updated Oct. 19, 2015). If USCIS denies the application, the applicant
may make an asylum application with the immigration court in removal proceedings. Id.
26. Id. An expedited removal process exists for individuals arriving in the United States
who are inadmissible. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018). This process allows for the removal of the individual from the United States without hearing or review. However, in the expedited removal process, an individual who indicates an intention
to seek asylum or fear of persecution must be given a “credible fear” interview with a USCIS
asylum officer. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). Under this
process, an immigration officer from USCIS is allowed to conduct a preliminary interview of
an asylum applicant to determine whether the applicant has a “credible fear” of persecution
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may appeal the decisions of the immigration judge to the BIA and
the decisions of the BIA to the U.S. circuit court in which the im27
migration judge sits.
The standard of review for determinations of the Attorney General and administrative bodies, such as the BIA, is highly deferential. The U.S. circuit courts are required to give deference to the
agency’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including its definition of membership in
28
a particular social group set forth in Matter of M-E-V-G-. However,
the Attorney General and the BIA cannot “adjudicate claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally” or “generate erratic,
29
irreconcilable interpretations of their governing statutes.” In determining whether the interpretation is “reasonable,” “consistency
30
over time and across subjects is a relevant factor.”
Although U.S. circuit courts may conduct a de novo review of issues of law, issues of fact are reviewed under the substantial31
evidence test. A decision by the BIA or the Attorney General will
be upheld if, considering the record as a whole, it is supported by

or torture. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). A credible fear is
defined as a “significant possibility” that the applicant “could establish eligibility for asylum.”
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). If the asylum officer finds that the applicant does not have a credible fear, the applicant may seek review of the determination by
an immigration judge, but the immigration judge’s decision in general cannot be appealed
with limited exceptions. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III)
(2018); 8 C.F.R. §1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2018); INA § 242(e), 8 U.S.C. §1252(e) (2018). If
the asylum officer determines the applicant has such a credible fear, he or she may present
their asylum claim to an immigration judge in the standard removal process. INA §
235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iv) (2018).
27. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: HOW TO FILE A PETITION
FOR REVIEW 2 (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
practice_advisory/how_to_file_a_petition_for_review_2015_update.pdf.
28. See National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005) (finding that under Chevron if a statute is ambiguous, and if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable, the court must accept the agency’s interpretation, but
“unexplained inconsistency” in an agency’s interpretation is “a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984) (finding that if the intent of Congress on an issue is unambiguous, an
agency must follow that intent, but if a statute is ambiguous on an issue, “the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 230 (recognizing that a reviewing court must respect
an agency’s “reasonable interpretation” of the law).
29. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Marmolejo–Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), and
citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30).
30. Id.
31. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43; Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537,
542 (7th Cir. 2011)).
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reasonable, substantial and probative evidence. 32 The record must
compel reversal for the U.S. circuit courts to reverse factual findings of the BIA meaning “a reasonable fact finder would have to
33
conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.”
B. Definition of Refugee in U.S. and International Law34
The United States’ definition of refugee is largely based on the
international law definition, derived from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). The 1951
35
Convention is a United Nations treaty, which provided the first
internationally accepted definition of a refugee. Drawn in the aftermath of World War II, the 1951 Convention’s definition was influenced by the politically, racially, and religiously motivated per36
secution inflicted by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The
1951 Convention refugee definition limited its protection to European refugees after World War II; the 1967 Protocol removed the
time and geographical limitations contained in the 1951 Conven37
tion and expanded its scope.

32. Cece, 733 F.3d at 669 (quoting Escobar, 657 F.3d at 545).
33. INS. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citing NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)).
34. This Article focuses on asylum as a path for relief, which may provide protection for
women who flee intimate partner violence in their countries. However, other paths for relief
may include withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and withholding of removal under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16 (2018); see INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018).
Withholding of removal requires a higher standard demonstrating that an applicant would
“more likely than not” suffer persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” in the proposed country of removal. 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b), 1208.16(b). In contrast, asylum requires a “well-founded fear” of future
persecution on account of these same grounds. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b), 1208.13(b) (2013).
The Convention Against Torture requires the applicant to show that it is “more likely than
not” that she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16(c), 1205.16(c) (2000). Further, while these withholding of removal paths may
provide temporary relief, unlike asylum, they do not make an individual eligible for permanent residency or citizenship.
35. The 1951 Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
36. See, e.g., Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Unequal Protection, 58 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 56, 59 (2002); Stephanie Robins, Note, Backing It Up: Real ID’s Impact on the Corroboration Standard in Women’s Private Asylum Claims, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 435, 442–43
(2014).
37. The 1967 Protocol defines the term “refugee” as a person who:
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The United States became a party to the 1967 Protocol in 1968.
Congress then passed the Refugee Act of 1980 and incorporated
the provisions—including the definition of a refugee—of the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol into the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to bring the country into compliance with its obli38
gations under the 1967 Protocol. Under the Act, a refugee is defined as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
39
social group, or political opinion. Race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion are
commonly referred to as “Convention reasons,” “Convention
grounds,” or “the five categories/grounds” for asylum or refugee
40
status. The United States refers to persons who meet the definition of refugee who are outside the United States as “refugees” and
persons who meet the definition of refugee who are inside the
41
United States as “asylees.”
The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have historically been
interpreted without regard to the unique protection needs of

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating in part the 1951 Convention’s definition of “refugee”); see 1951 Convention supra
note 35, ch. 1, art. 1A(2), at 152.
38. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427–29, 436–37 (1987).
39. Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a “refugee” is:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b),
1208.13(b) (2018).
40. See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 3, at 2518 (referring to “five protected grounds”); Musalo, supra note 3, at 783 (referencing “Convention reason,” “five . . . grounds,” and “Convention grounds”); Melanie Randall, Particularized Social Groups and Categorical Imperatives in
Refugee Law: State Failures to Recognize Gender and the Legal Reception of Gender Persecution Claims
in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 529,
531, 542 (2015) (referring to “five protected grounds” and “convention ground”).
41. Refugees & Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATIONS SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum (last updated Nov. 12, 2015).
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women asylum seekers. 42 The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), in its Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
has also acknowledged that traditionally “the refugee definition
43
has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences.”
In response, the United Nations, individual countries, nongovernmental organizations, academics, and practitioners, among
others, have made significant efforts in the last thirty years to address gender-based asylum, including asylum claims based on inti44
mate partner violence.
Even before Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s recent decision
questioning the viability of asylum claims involving intimate partner violence, many women asylum seekers who have experienced
intimate partner violence historically encountered specific barriers
to obtaining asylum status in the United States. This difficulty can
be attributed to a combination of interpretive issues related to the
45
46
refugee definition, fears of opening the floodgates, and a lack of
training for adjudicators on asylum claims related to intimate part47
ner violence.
42. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 3, at 780.
43. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 2.
44. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 3, at 777–79, 781–82 (referring to the progress made on
women’s claims in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia); Karen Musalo, A Short
History of Gender Asylum in the United States Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly be Inching
Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46, 49 (2010) reprinted in U.C.
HASTINGS SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2010) [hereinafter Musalo, A Short History] (stating
that in 1985, the UNHCR and its Executive Committee began issuing guidance on the interpretative barriers to the protection of refugee women); Musalo & Knight, supra note 36,
at 57–59 (recognizing that advocates have made significant progress toward the recognition
of women’s rights and momentum for the protection of women refugees is growing); Randall, supra note 40, at 532 (acknowledging advancements in the reception of women’s asylum claims).
45. See Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82.
46. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to
(Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132 (2007) (“Perhaps the overarching basis
for the opposition to gender claims is the fear that acceptance of these cases will result in
the floodgates.”); see also Marsden, supra note 3, at 2553–55 (“One criticism that has been
leveled at proposals to make it easier for women to seek asylum on the basis of domestic violence is that doing so will open a “floodgate” of female asylum-seekers to the United
States.”).
47. See Barbara R. Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past, Present, and
Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. REV. 225, 266–68 (2011)
(asserting that training for adjudicators, requiring the review of Department of State Human Rights Reports and updates on the status of intimate partner asylum claims are “small
steps” that should be taken to ensure intimate partner violence asylum claims are properly
adjudicated); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14, at 372–73 (arguing that if adjudicators do
not understand the complex dynamics of abusive relationships, new regulations cannot assist adjudicators in the assessment of asylum claims involving intimate partner violence).
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Three primary interpretative issues regularly arise for women
asylum seekers in satisfying the threshold requirements in asylum
48
proceedings. First, women may be persecuted on the basis of
their gender, which is not included as one of the five categories in
the 1951 Convention to be protected from targeted persecution
(race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
49
group, and political opinion). Rather, immigration judges’
recognition of gender-based claims has followed a disturbing pat50
tern of “particularization” under the “particular social group”
category. This means rather than using a more general common
characteristic which may define a group, the group is further divided in to several subsets of common characteristics. For example,
rather than refer to “women,” an immigration judge might refer to
“[i]ndigenous Guatemalan women perceived as the property of
and suffering domestic violence at the hands of their intimate
51
partners, and who are unable to safely leave the relationship.”
This particularization ignores the fact that the persecution is carried out because of gender itself as opposed to gender plus other
52
characteristics.
Second, although the refugee definition was formed recognizing
public acts of persecution inflicted by the state, it did not make any
specific considerations for persecution that occurs in private and is
53
perpetrated by private actors. While male asylum seekers’ claims
often involve a state actor, such as a government entity or police,
women asylum seekers’ claims more regularly involve private or
non-state actors including intimate partners, fathers, or other male
54
relatives. Under U.S. law, an asylum applicant who suffers persecution inflicted by a non-state actor must also demonstrate that the
55
state is unable and unwilling to provide protection. This makes

48. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82.
49. Id.; see also Randall, supra note 40, at 531.
50. Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A
Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 292 (2002).
51. See Jeronimo v. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 799 (11th Cir. 2017).
52. Randall, supra note 50.
53. Id. at 305–06; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the
International Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 9 (2006) (“The threshold legal barrier to
addressing male violence against women internationally has been that both the perpetrators
and the victims are private persons, termed nonstate actors.”).
54. See Robins, supra note 36, at 436–37; Musalo, A Short History, supra note 44, at 49.
55. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No.
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
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corroboration of persecution in non-state actor asylum cases much
56
more difficult.
Third, the harms suffered by women are often different from
57
those suffered by men. These harms may be accepted by the soci58
ety or culture. For instance, intimate partner violence is a harm
59
that primarily is inflicted on women rather than men. That women are disproportionately affected by this harm has impacted determinations as to whether women who suffer this harm fall under
one of the five categories to be protected from persecution, in par60
ticular political opinion and particular social group categories.
Further, because women experience intimate partner violence in
every country, this fosters the view of intimate partner violence as a
private criminal matter outside the scope of the refugee defini61
tion. However, this perception ignores the fact that many societies and cultures accept intimate partner violence against women
because of their gender and, for this reason, these women may
62
meet the requirements of the refugee definition. These interpretive issues significantly and negatively impact the adjudication of
women’s asylum claims involving intimate partner violence.
Gender is the most critical aspect of an asylum claim based on
intimate partner violence in that it is at once the immutable char63
acteristic forming a particular social group, the nexus between
56. Robins, supra note 36 (asserting that persecution occurs in private places where
government actors are not present and governments may not be motivated to interfere in
private, family matters, so it can be difficult for women to corroborate their asylum claims).
57. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10.
60. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335 (“Social groups defined by their vulnerability to
private criminal activity likely lack the particularity required under M-E-V-G-, given that
broad swaths of society may be susceptible to victimization.”); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906,
916 (A.G. 2001) (“As we understand the respondent’s rationale, it would seem that virtually
any victim of repeated violence who offers some resistance could qualify for asylum, particularly where the government did not control the assailant.”); Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82,
782 n.32.
61. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335; In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 916; UNHCR Gender
Guidelines, supra note 10.
62. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at
929–46 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); Supplemental Brief for Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. at 14–15, In re L-R- (B.I.A. 2009), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/
files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf [hereinafter DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief]
(certain docket information redacted); Brief for Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 5, 26–28, In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005) (No. A
73
753
922),
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A%20DHS%20brief.pdf [hereinafter DHS R-A- Brief].
63. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014) overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 316; see also In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that the
shared characteristic of “sex” may form the basis for a particular social group and persecu-
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the harm (intimate partner violence) and the particular social
64
group (namely, women), and the basis for the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect the victim (entrenched misogyny
65
and systemic sexism). In particular, asylum claims by women involving intimate partner violence have issues arising out of three
key elements of this refugee definition: (1) past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution, (2) on account of (“nexus”), (3) membership in a particular social group. The following is
a description of these elements.
1. Persecution
Neither U.S. law nor the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
66
Protocol provide a definition of persecution. However, the BIA
has recognized two aspects of the term “persecution”:
(1) harm or suffering is inflicted upon the individual in order to punish her for possessing a belief or characteristic a
persecutor sought to overcome; and
(2) harm or suffering was inflicted either by government
actors or by persons or an organization that the govern67
ment was unable or unwilling to control.
When government actors inflict the persecution, the applicant
need not demonstrate that she reported the harm to the police or
68
other state actors. However, if non-governmental actors are the
persecutors, the applicant must demonstrate that the government

tion may be directed towards an individual because of her membership in such a group),
overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
64. See Marsden, supra note 3. See generally Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82 (describing,
in the context of gender asylum claims, the nexus requirement between the particular social
group and the harm at issue).
65. See Musalo, supra note 3, at 797–806 (discussing several jurisdictions that have recognized the causal link between gender-related persecution and the inability or unwillingness of the state to offer protection).
66. See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation as Ground for
Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In re Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender
Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 375, 378 (1997); E. Dana Neacsu, Gender
Based Persecution as a Basis for Asylum: An Annotated Bibliography, 1993–2002, 95 L. LIBR. J. 191,
193 (2003); U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at 13, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3 (2011).
67. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222.
68. Joline Doedens, The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 22 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 111, 114 (2014) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2013); Baballah v.
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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was unable or unwilling to protect her after reporting the persecution or that reporting the persecution would be “futile” because
the government has failed to protect others who have made similar
69
reports.
If a person has shown that she has been persecuted in the past, a
presumption exists that she also has a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to her country of nationality or habitual resi70
dence. Thus, the DHS will then bear the burden to overcome the
presumption by proving either a “fundamental change of circumstances” eliminating the person’s well-founded fear or that it is reasonable for the person to escape persecution by relocating in her
71
country of nationality or habitual residence. Nevertheless, an applicant need not have suffered past persecution if she can establish
72
that she has a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.
2. Nexus
Once an applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution, she must show that it is on account of one of the five enumerated grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
73
membership in a particular social group. This is referred to as the
“nexus” between persecution and one of the five protected
69. Id. at 113–15 (citing IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM
LAW 1-1 (2d ed. 2013); Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also In
re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365
(B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing that “persecution can consist of the infliction of harm or suffering by . . . persons a government is unwilling or unable to control.”); Memorandum from
Phyllis Coven, Director, INS Office of International Affairs, to all INS Asylum Officers and
HQASM Coordinators 17 (May 26, 1995), reprinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 781 (1995)
[hereinafter Coven Memorandum]; Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The
Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1230–31
(2009) (citing Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006)).
70. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1) (2018).
71. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i), 1208.13(b)(1)(i) (2018).
72. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2), 1208.13(b)(2) (2018). In order to establish a “wellfounded” fear of persecution:
the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the [individual] possesses a belief or
characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment
of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware,
that the [individual] possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has
the capability of punishing the [individual]; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the [individual].
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
73. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)–(2),
1208.13(b)(1)–(2); see Musalo, supra note 3, at 781.
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grounds. 74 In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which required that the applicant demonstrate that one of the five protected grounds is “at least one central reason for persecuting the ap75
plicant.”
3. Particular Social Group as One of the
Five Enumerated Grounds
The “particular social group” category was created in order to
include groups of persons who may not fall under one of other
grounds for asylum but are deserving of protection. 76 Yet, its draft77
ers did not define particular social group at its inception. As a result, confusing interpretations of the particular social group category and applications of those interpretations to the facts of each
case has plagued asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group. This is particularly true in asylum claims involving
persecution based on gender, such as intimate partner violence.
The Attorney General’s determination in Matter of A-B- is one of
the most recent demonstrations of the confusing interpretation of
the particular social group category and its application in a genderbased asylum case involving intimate partner violence. As gender is
not one of the five enumerated grounds for asylum, it has primarily been considered under the particular social group ground. In
early interpretations of the particular social group category, gender constituted an immutable characteristic, which could form a
78
particular social group.

74. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781.
75. Doedens, supra note 68, at 116–17 (citing REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018)); Robins, supra note 36, at 441–42.
76. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2517.
77. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232 (“Congress did not indicate what it understood [membership in a particular social group] to mean, nor is its meaning clear.”).
78. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that women in Iran
could constitute a particular social group); see also Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034
(8th Cir. 2008) (Cameroonian widows); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir.
2007) (Somali females); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (female
tribe members). For a discussion of cases recognizing that gender or sex may constitute a
social group, see Brief of The Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program et al. as
Amici Curiae, at 7–8, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://
uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291242765358.
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C. Interpretation of “Particular Social Group” as
One of the Five Convention Grounds
Using the doctrine of ejusdem generis 79 in 1985, the BIA initially
interpreted the particular social group category in Matter of Acosta
as
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties,
or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land owner80
ship.
The determination is made on a case-by-case basis, but the characteristic must be either “beyond the power of an individual to
change or . . . so fundamental to individual identity or conscience
81
that it ought not be required to be changed.” Since Matter of
Acosta, the definition of the particular social group category has
82
undergone a significant evolution.
In 2008, the BIA formally added the requirements of “particularity” and “social visibility” to its interpretation of a particular social
83
group in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-. The Third and Seventh Circuits refused to recognize the BIA’s new “particularity”
and “social visibility” requirements, finding them to be inconsistent
with prior BIA determinations, confusing, and an unnecessary ad84
dition to the social group test set forth in Acosta. In Matter of M-E79. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“[G]eneral words used in an enumeration
with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words.”).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 233–34.
82. See generally Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 355, 367–379 (2015) (discussing the judicial treatment of the Acosta standard in the
years following the decision); Kenneth Ludlum, Note, Defining Membership in a Particular Social Group: The Search for a Uniform Approach to Adjudicating Asylum Applications in the United
States, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115, 119–24 (2015) (discussing the history of interpretation of the
particular social group category since Acosta).
83. In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579
(B.I.A. 2008).
84. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that “the breadth
of category has never been a per se bar to protected status” and finding the BIA’s decision
inconsistent with its own precedent following Matter of Acosta, which had established the test
for whether a social group is cognizable); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582,
603–06 (3d Cir. 2011) (directing the BIA to clarify the requirements of “particularity” and
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V-G-, the BIA attempted to provide further explanation of its interpretation of the particular social group category. 85 Although the
BIA included Matter of Acosta’s common, immutable characteristic
requirement in its definition, it clarified two additional require86
ments in establishing a particular social group. As explained by
the BIA in Matter of M-E-V-G-, a particular social group must be: (1)
composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic (Matter of Acosta test), (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
87
socially distinct within the society in question.
Regarding particularity, the BIA expounded that a particular social group “must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear
benchmark for determining who falls within the group” and must
88
have “discrete” and “definable boundaries.” The BIA renamed
“social visibility” as “social distinction” and clarified that it signifies
that a society considers the members to comprise a group regard89
less of whether the group’s members can be identified by sight.
Although the BIA recognized that these requirements might overlap, it argued that “particularity” is focused on the outer limits of
the group’s boundaries and “social visibility” on whether a society
90
would perceive a proposed group as separate or distinct. At the
same time, it acknowledged that societal considerations were im91
portant to both requirements.
Scholars have argued that the addition of the requirements of
“particularity” and “social distinction” to the interpretation of a
particular social group is inconsistent with the principle of ejusdem

“social visibility” after finding their usage was inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and not
entitled to Chevron deference); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We
just don’t see what work ‘social visibility’ does.”).
85. On remand, the BIA defended its decision by asserting that it had not created new
requirements to its interpretation of “particular social groups”; rather, it had simply provided the term with more “concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.”
In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); see also In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 239 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007)).
89. Id. at 240.
90. Id. at 241.
91. Id. The Third Circuit has found that the BIA adequately articulated why it understood “social visibility” and “particularity” to be separate requirements for establishing a
cognizable social group. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 553 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing In re
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239–41, 244). Notably, the Seventh Circuit has not accepted
these articulations of “particularity” and “social distinction” and thus far has declined to determine whether these requirements are entitled to Chevron deference. See, e.g., Cece v.
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674 (7th Cir. 2013); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.
2009).
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generis as they compel consideration of more than common immutable characteristics required by race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. 92 Further, the BIA’s “particularity” and “social distinction” requisites for demonstrating the existence of a particular
social group have been one of the causes of the inconsistent determinations in asylum cases of women who have suffered persecu93
tion in the form of intimate partner violence. This is because societal considerations and perceptions are essential to both
94
requirements of particularity and social distinction. A society may
not recognize intimate partner violence as a problem in their
country due to its hidden nature within the society, its social acceptability, or its insignificance in the society due to the subordina95
tion of women.
That women from certain countries who suffer intimate partner
violence may have a viable asylum claim is not new to the U.S. immigration system. In fact, the INS recognized it as early as 1995. In
her May 26, 1995, memorandum to INS asylum officials, the Director of the INS Office of International Affairs, Phyllis Coven, explained that domestic violence is a form of harm “primarily directed” at women and “may serve as evidence of past persecution
96
on account of one or more of the five grounds” for asylum.
The following sections discuss the seminal cases that provide interpretations of a particular social group as applied to genderbased claims, including those involving intimate partner violence.
D. Matter of Kasinga: Interpretation of Particular Social Group as
Applied to Gender-Based Claims
One of the most important BIA decisions analyzing the particular social group category in a gender-based asylum claim is Matter of
97
Kasinga, decided in 1996. In Matter of Kasinga, the nineteen-year-

92. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 105 (2008); Liliya Paraketsova, Note, Why Guidance from the Supreme Court is Required in Redefining the Particular Social Group Definition in Refugee Law, 51 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 449–50 (2018).
93. Elizabeth Zambrana, The Social Distinction of “Invisible” Harms: How Recent Developments in the Particular Social Group Standard Fall Short for Victims of Gender-Based Harms Committed by Private Actors, 36 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 236, 259–64 (2015).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Coven Memorandum, supra note 69, § II(a).
97. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
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old applicant was a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe in
northern Togo. Women in her tribe were forced to undergo female genital mutilation (FGM) at around fifteen years old. Ms.
Kasinga, however, had not been subjected to FGM because her father had protected her from the practice. Her father later died.
Following his death, Ms. Kasinga’s mother was forced to leave Togo, and Ms. Kasinga went to live with her father’s sister. Her aunt
forced her to marry a man with three other wives when she was
seventeen. Her husband and her aunt then made plans for her to
undergo FGM according to tribal custom.
The applicant, fearing that she would be forced to undergo
FGM, eventually fled to the United States asking for asylum once
98
she reached the airport. She claimed a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of her membership in a particular social
group made up of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose
99
the practice.” Using the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social
group” in Matter of Acosta, the BIA found that the “characteristics of
being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe’ cannot be changed. The characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a
100
young woman that she should not be required to change it.”
The BIA found that FGM is practiced on account of sexual characteristics of young women of the tribe who do not want to be sub101
jected to FGM. FGM constituted “sexual oppression” derived
from society’s purpose in promoting “male dominance and exploi102
tation.” Her fear of persecution was countrywide as her husband
was a friend of the police, FGM was widely practiced, police tolerated violence towards women, Togo had a poor human rights record, and “most African women [could] expect little government
103
protection from FGM.” Kasinga was found to have a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of a particular social group, her
fear was determined to be countrywide, and thus, she was granted
104
asylum.
Although not identified as such in Kasinga, Karen Musalo has
pointed out that the BIA employed the bifurcated analysis used by
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
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the British House of Lords and the UNHCR. 105 The bifurcated
analysis recognizes that persecution on account of a particular social group, or nexus, may be evidenced if: (1) the non-state actor
persecutes the woman based on her membership in a particular
social group or (2) the state is unwilling or unable to offer protection from the persecution based on her membership in a particu106
lar social group. Since the problem for women who are persecuted is finding a nexus between the non-state actor’s persecution and
the particular social group ground, the bifurcated analysis has al107
lowed the United Kingdom and other countries to give protection to women despite the nexus problem. The approach allows
the consideration of not only the motives of the persecutor, but also takes into account the state’s or society’s involvement in the persecution by establishing the “causal connection” between the particular social group ground and the non-state perpetrator or the
108
state/society. This bifurcated analysis is especially important as it
provides “an analytical path around the barrier created by the
characterization of family violence as ‘personal’ rather than as a
109
Convention reason.”
Although the social group identified by the BIA included “gender, ethnicity, and opposition to FGM,” no decision was made as to
whether the social group could be comprised of gender alone.
Nevertheless, Kasinga continues to be one of the most important
105. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–87. In Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2
AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.), the applicants were citizens of Pakistan and risked
being falsely accused of adultery in Pakistan. They fled to the United Kingdom and applied
for asylum claiming that the state would not provide protection and, if returned, they would
be subjected to criminal proceedings for sexual immorality. The House of Lords found that
the women were members of a gender-related social group and, while their husbands did
not abuse them on the grounds of their membership in this group, the State was unwilling
to protect them due to their gender. Through this approach, the nexus between the persecution and the particular social group was established. Three of the four Lords of the majority defined the social group as “women in Pakistan” while the fourth described it as Pakistani
women who are accused of adultery and have no State protection. The State’s failure to provide protection to these women from persecution by their husbands fulfilled the required
nexus to the ground of a particular social group. Id. at 787–89.
In Matter of Kasinga, the BIA found that there was a nexus between FGM and a particular social group based on gender. Karen Musalo analogizes the finding in Kasinga that FGM
constituted “sexual oppression” derived from society’s purpose in promoting “male dominance and exploitation” to the findings in Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC
629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). Musalo, supra note 3, at 800–01. The BIA in Kasinga
recognized that the nexus between persecution and particular social group status could be
established “not solely by reference to the individual perpetrators of [the harm], but within
a broader societal context.” Id.
106. Musalo, supra note 3, at 783–87.
107. See id. at 777.
108. Id. at 777–79.
109. Id. at 790.
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authorities analyzing a gender-based asylum claim. 110 The decision
in Kasinga has continued to be validated by the BIA, including under the new three-part test required to establish a particular social
111
group clarified in Matter of M-E-V-G-.
As discussed further below, the Attorney General’s recent determination in Matter of A-B- is void of any substantive discussion of
Matter of Kasinga. If the analysis of the Attorney General were to be
employed in Kasinga today, it is uncertain whether Ms. Kasinga
could establish that she was a member of a cognizable social group,
a nexus between the persecution and the social group, that the
government was unable or unwilling to provide protection to her,
or that her fear of persecution was countrywide. The possibility
that gender-based asylum claims involving FGM may not meet the
Attorney General’s interpretation of the refugee definition is
alarming and further evidences his confusing and flawed analysis
of a gender-based asylum claim.
E. Interpretation of the Particular Social Group Category as Applied to
Victims of Intimate Partner Violence
1. Matter of R-A-

112

The history of inconsistent and even erratic adjudications in asylum cases based on gender and intimate partner relationships as
113
particular social groups is well documented. Particularly, in 2000,
the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- roused significant controversy
114
and impeded progress in gender-related asylum claims. In that
case, the applicant, Ms. Alvarado, a citizen of Guatemala who was
115
married, claimed abhorrent physical and sexual abuse.

110. Id. at 798 (“Significant for purposes of this analysis, however, is the fact that the vacating of Matter of R-A- leaves Matter of Kasinga as the most relevant authority on gender asylum claims. It is on this basis that the unifying rationale of a bifurcated nexus analysis can be
reinvigorated.”).
111. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238 (B.I.A. 2014).
112. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001).
113. See, e.g., Barreno, supra note 47, at 231–50; Musalo, supra note 3.
114. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2529.
115. The immigration judge found that the applicant was persecuted by her husband on
account of her membership in a particular social group, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service subsequently appealed the decision to the BIA. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at
906–09.
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Although the BIA acknowledged that Ms. Alvarado had established that the harm she had suffered amounted to persecution, it
found that she failed to establish her membership in a particular
social group comprised of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
116
women are to live under male domination.” The BIA reasoned
that the interpretation of what forms a particular social group in
117
Matter of Acosta is only a starting point. “Shared descriptive characteristics” are not enough to constitute a particular social group.
If that were all that needed to be shown, “the social group concept
118
would virtually swallow the entire refugee definition.” In an early
formulation of the “social visibility”/“social distinction” requirement discussed above, the BIA explained that the applicant had
not shown that the identified particular social group was a recognized segment of the society, that the society expected women to
be abused, or the “prominence or importance” of the characteris119
tics of the proposed particular social group within the society.
Further, the BIA found that Ms. Alvarado failed to demonstrate
the requisite nexus, meaning that her husband abused her on ac120
count of her membership in the particular social group. Rather,
he targeted her because she was his wife and not because he rec121
ognized that she was a part of the social group. In particular, the
BIA rejected the argument that a government’s failure to provide
effective protection is a “reliable indicator of the motivations be122
hind the actions of private parties.” Although the government
may have tolerated the abuse inflicted upon the applicant by her
husband, this did not prove that the Guatemalan government sup123
ports domestic violence and abuse. In addition, the BIA stated
that by equating “private acts of violence” with “governmental persecution” when protection is ineffective would render the “‘on ac124
count of’ requirement” meaningless.
The BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- was widely criticized, which
led the INS to draft amended regulations on the particular social

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 917–18.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 920–21.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id. at 923.
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group category that specifically addressed gender-related issues.125
The INS published the proposed rule that would amend the regu126
lations in 2000. In 2001, Attorney General Janet Reno vacated
the BIA’s decision in R-A- and remanded the case back to the BIA
127
for reconsideration after the regulations were finalized. In 2004,
Attorney General John Ashcroft certified Matter of R-A- to himself,
128
and DHS filed a brief supporting a grant of asylum. In DHS’s
2004 brief, it argued that the BIA’s decision in R-A-—rejecting the
existence of a particular social group and the nexus between the
persecution and the particular social group—to be “flawed and, if
reinstated as precedent, would impede rational, coherent devel129
opment of particular social group law.”
DHS acknowledged that women who fear domestic violence may
130
meet the requirements for asylum. In particular, DHS recognized
that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship” would meet the requirements for a particular social
131
group. Ms. Alvarado’s husband abused her on account of her
membership in this group because he believed, as his wife, she was
subordinate to him. 132 Social norms in Guatemala supported this
belief and, as such, his abuse was tolerated by the Guatemalan gov133
ernment and society.

125. See, e.g., Barreno, supra note 47, at 238 (discussing the drafting of amended regulations by the INS); Marsden, supra note 3, at 2529 (explaining that the holding was “immediately criticized”).
126. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
127. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec at 906.
128. See generally DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62.
129. Id. at 15.
130. See generally id.
131. Id. at 26–28.
132. Id. at 36.
133. Id. at 40–42. Additionally, the dissent in Matter of R-A- is particularly instructive in
addressing the flawed analysis of the BIA majority opinion. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906,
929–946 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting).
The applicant suffered harm in part due to the government’s inaction and refusal to
intervene. The dissent highlighted the findings of the immigration judge that the institutional biases in Guatemala derive from “‘a pervasive belief, common in patriarchal societies,
that a man should be able to control a wife or female companion by any means he sees fit:
including rape, torture, and beatings.’” Id. at 930. On account of this societal belief that
men should control their wife or female companion coupled with the fact that domestic
abuse is considered a family matter, abusive husbands or partners are not brought to justice
and protection is unavailable to victims. Id. The dissent argued that the applicant has a
“fundamental right” to protection from abuse on account of her gender. Id. at 931. In the
situation that domestic abuse occurs in combination with state acquiescence, the victim
should be protected under asylum law.
Concerning the nexus between the persecution and one of the five protected grounds,
the dissent appeared to support the bifurcated analysis put forth in Islam v. Sec’y of State for
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Ultimately, in 2005, Attorney General Ashcroft, like Attorney
General Reno, remanded the case to the BIA for consideration
when the regulations were finalized. The regulations were, in fact,
134
never finalized and the case remained stayed by the BIA. A third
attorney general, Michael Mukasey, in 2008, remanded the case to
the BIA again to reconsider specific issues related to asylum claims
135
stemming from domestic violence. After ten years and no reconsideration on remand, the DHS finally stipulated to Ms. Alvarado’s
eligibility for asylum, and her application was granted by an immi136
gration judge in December 2009.
Although the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- was vacated, and its
analysis was determined to be flawed even by DHS, Attorney General Sessions utilized much of the analysis of the BIA in Matter of RA- in support of his decision in Matter of A-B-. His decision appears
to be an attempt to return to the rejected analysis of the BIA in
2000.

the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.), which had been rejected by
the majority. Compare In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 935–937 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting) (citing the case with approval), with id. at 920 n.2 (majority opinion) (indicating disapproval of the case’s nexus analysis). The facts clearly provided proof that the
husband targeted the applicant on the basis of her gender when he used abuse in order to
affirm his domination over her. The dissent believed that, when addressing nexus, it is important to consider the “factual circumstances surrounding the violence.” Id. at 938 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting). In addition, the dissent, unlike the majority, recognized that the difficulty in determining the husband’s motives only “supports the respondrespondent’s claim that the harm is ‘on account of’ a protected ground.” Compare id., with id.
at 916 (majority opinion). The majority, according to the dissent, missed the point that no
“good reason” actually exists for the husband’s abuse. Id. at 938 (Guendelsberger, Board
Member, dissenting). The dissent went further to say that “[i]llegitimate motives can give
rise to an inference that the harm has occurred on account of a statutorily protected characteristic,” such as the applicant’s membership in a particular social group. Id. Finally, the dissent asserted that the BIA should consider the reasons behind this violence. Id. at 939. The
BIA found that FGM aims to control “women’s sexuality.” Id. Like FGM, domestic violence is
also a means used by men to subordinate women. Id. The husband in this case acted on account of the applicant’s gender, their relationship, and the fact that he knew, “as a woman
subject to his subordination, the respondent would receive no protection from the authorities if she resisted his abuse and persecution.” Id. Applying the bifurcated approach, the dissent would have found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of her membership in the identified social group.
134. See, e.g., Musalo & Knight, supra note 36, at 60 (describing Attorney General Janet
Reno’s actions in 2001); Barreno, supra note 47, at 237 (describing Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s actions in 2005).
135. See In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 629 (A.G. 2008); see also Musalo & Knight, supra
note 36, at 59; Barreno, supra note 47, at 237.
136. See Musalo & Knight, supra note 36, at 60; Barreno, supra note 47, at 248.
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2. Matter of L-RIn 2004, Ms. L-R- fled Mexico to escape twenty years of physical,
sexual, and mental abuse from her partner.137 He beat and raped
her repeatedly. In one circumstance after she tried to flee, he
found her and attempted to burn her alive. Ms. L-R-’s abuser further threatened violence against their children to prevent her escape. The police refused to help her, and even a judge asserted
that he would not help Ms. L-R- unless she had sex with him, which
she refused to do. When she fled to the United States, she applied
for asylum. An immigration judge denied her application.
She appealed to the BIA and, similar to its 2004 brief in Matter
of R-A-, DHS acknowledged that asylum claims involving domestic
138
violence could be viable. In particular, DHS recognized that particular social groups, such as “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who are
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship” may be cognizable because they meet the immutability,
139
particularity, and visibility requirements. DHS explained that Ms.
L-R-’s particular social group is “best defined in light of the evidence about how the respondent’s abuser and her society perceive
140
her role within the domestic relationship.” DHS found that Ms.
L-R-’s abuser and surrounding society perceived her role in a domestic relationship as subordinate. The case was remanded to the
immigration judge, and DHS stipulated that Ms. L-R- was eligible
for asylum. The immigration judge granted asylum in a summary
order stating that the grant was a result of the parties’ stipulation.
Both Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- represented progress in the
position taken by DHS recognizing the viability of asylum claims of
women involving intimate partner violence. However, because

137. In fact, Ms. L-R- had fled to the U.S. earlier, in 1991, but her partner found her and
forced her to return, threatening to take away her children and kill her. Matter of L-R-, CTR.
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited
Jan. 21, 2019); see also Natalie Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum and the Perpetuation of the Victimization Narrative, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 749–51 (2017).
138. DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note
62.
139. DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 26–
28. DHS explained “This evidence may reflect a societal view, applicable at least in parts of
Mexico, that the status of a woman in a domestic relationship places the woman into a segment of society that will not be accorded protection from harm inflicted by a domestic partner. In this light, the female respondent’s status by virtue of her relationship . . . could indeed be the kind of important characteristic that results in a significant social distinction
being drawn in terms of who will receive protection from serious physical harm.” Id. at 18.
140. Nanasi, supra note 137, at 746–51.
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these women were granted asylum in a summary order based on
the stipulation of the parties, the decisions granting asylum in
these cases did not provide any precedent for future asylum cases
141
based on intimate partner violence.
3. Matter of A-R-C-GIn 2014, the BIA, for the first time in a published case, recognized that a woman who feared persecution in the form of intimate
142
partner violence may meet the requirements of asylum. In the
case, Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA found that the applicant, Ms.
Cifuentes, was a member of a particular social group composed of
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela143
tionship.” The applicant suffered considerable abuse at the
hands of her husband; he beat her weekly, broke her nose, burned
144
her breast with paint thinner, and raped her. She sought protection from the police many times, but the police told her that they
145
would not interfere in a marital relationship. Ms. Cifuentes tried
to leave on a number of occasions, hiding at her father’s house.146
However, each time her husband found her and threatened to kill
147
her if she did not return to him.
The immigration judge denied Ms. Cifuentes’s asylum claim,
finding that she failed to demonstrate a nexus between her persecution and particular social group. In particular, the immigration
judge found that she had failed to provide sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that her husband abused her on account of the fact

141. See id. at 749, 751.
142. Unpublished decisions of the BIA are generally unavailable to the public. This is a
basis of a recent lawsuit filed by the New York Legal Assistance Group against the BIA, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), and DOJ. The BIA provides a hard copy of a
small percentage of its unpublished decisions in a reading room at the EOIR Law Library
and Immigration Research Center. See Complaint at 5, N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp. v. BIA, No.
18-cv-9495 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018), ECF No. 1 (citing EOIR, Library information and FAQs,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/library-faqs (last visited Oct. 15, 2018)); Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994
to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 109–11 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 9 (2017), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1103051/download [hereinafter IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL].
143. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
144. Id. at 389.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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that she was a “married woman in Guatemala who was unable to
148
leave the relationship.” Rather, the immigration judge deter149
mined, the abuse constituted arbitrary criminal acts. In Ms.
Cifuentes’s appeal to the BIA, the DHS conceded that she had suffered persecution on account of her membership in a particular
social group comprised of “married women in Guatemala who are
150
unable to leave their relationship.” Nevertheless, the BIA applied
151
152
153
its immutability, particularity, and social distinction require154
ments to determine if such a particular social group existed.
As to “immutability,” the BIA recognized that gender is an immutable characteristic and the group in Ms. Cifuentes’s case
155
shared gender as an immutable characteristic. The BIA further
recognized that marital status, when the individual is unable to
leave the relationship, could constitute an immutable characteris156
tic. But, such a determination would be dependent upon the
157
facts and evidence in a particular case. The BIA went on to list
some of the factors which would be relevant to this analysis, such as
whether dissolution of the marriage is possible in light of religious,
cultural, moral, or legal constraints; background country infor158
mation; and the applicant’s own experiences.
In regard to “particularity,” the BIA acknowledged that the
terms of “married,” “women” and “unable to leave the relationship” have “commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan so159
ciety.” The BIA found that the terms could be combined to create a group with discrete and definable boundaries acknowledging
that a married woman’s inability to leave a relationship may be informed by societal expectations about gender, subordination, and
160
legal constraints on divorce and separation. In particular, the

148. Id. at 389–90.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 390.
151. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
152. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208
(B.I.A. 2014).
153. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227; In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208.
154. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390–95.
155. Id. at 392.
156. Id. at 392–93.
157. Id. at 393.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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applicant sought protection from the police, but they refused to
161
help her because of her marital relationship.
In its application of the “social distinction” requirement, the BIA
found that Guatemalan society makes meaningful distinctions
based on the common immutable characteristics of being a mar162
ried woman in a domestic relationship that she cannot leave.
Specifically, evidence in Ms. Cifuentes’s case demonstrated a cul163
ture of “machismo and family violence” in Guatemala. Guatemala’s laws for prosecution of domestic violence crimes were not regularly enforced because the police often failed to respond to
164
domestic violence disturbances. Again, the BIA provided examples of evidence that could be offered in support of social distinction in a domestic violence-related asylum claim. These included:
“whether the society in question recognizes the need to offer protection to victims of domestic violence, including whether the
country has criminal laws designed to protect domestic abuse victims, whether those laws are effectively enforced, and other socio165
political factors.” An applicant can demonstrate this evidence
through documented country conditions, law enforcement statistics, expert witnesses, an applicant’s past experiences, and other
166
credible sources of information. Accordingly, the BIA determined that its own analysis was in accord with the DHS’s concession that Ms. Cifuentes had suffered past persecution on account
of her particular social group comprised of married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.
Although the BIA’s favorable determination of an asylum claim
involving domestic violence in a published decision was significant,
167
the BIA’s analysis and holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- was narrow.
In Matter of A-B-, discussed below, Attorney General Sessions asserted that Matter of A-R-C-G- recognized an expansive new category of
asylum claims based on private violence. In reality, the particular
social group category—“married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship”—was restrictive. The BIA rec-

161. Id.
162. Id. at 394.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 395.
167. Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards and
Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2016) (asserting that the legal holding in
the case is “narrow and fact-specific,” continuing to allow immigration judges significant discretion).
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ognized that “gender” is an immutable characteristic, but the addition of “married women” and “unable to leave their relationship”
to define the particular social group in A-R-C-G- ignored that women in general, unmarried or married, may suffer harm from male
intimate partners or family members and a government may fail to
168
protect them. Gender alone could have formed this particular
social group.
Further, the BIA’s opinion put substantial emphasis on DHS’s
169
concessions in the case. The BIA asserted repeatedly that when
“concessions are not made and accepted as binding,” immigration
judges would decide the issues in asylum claims, including those
involving domestic violence, depending on the facts and circum170
stances of each case. In asylum claims involving a proposed particular social group, similar to that in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the relevant considerations may include: (a) whether inability to leave a
marriage constitutes an immutable characteristic, and (b) whether
the group of married women in a domestic relationship who are
unable to leave has discrete and definable boundaries and is social171
ly distinct.
Although Matter of A-R-C-G recognized an asylum claim involving
intimate partner violence, it did not ultimately resolve the primary
interpretive barriers to gender-based asylum claims:
(1) that persecution of women is often inflicted because of
their gender, which is not one of the five grounds for asylum; . . .
(2) that women are often persecuted by non-state actors or
private persons, rather than by their country’s government,
but the government is unable or unwilling to provide protection for these women from such persecution[; and]
(3) that women suffer harms which are often different
from the harms suffered by men, they are disproportionately affected by these harms, and societies and cultures often
172
condone or acquiesce to these harms.

168. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93; see Gabriela Corrales, Justice Delayed is Justice
Denied: The Real Significance of Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 70, 84–85
(2016).
169. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93.
170. Id. at 393.
171. Id. at 388, 390, 393–95.
172. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82. These barriers continue to directly impact determinations about whether a cognizable particular social group was identified, whether the
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Unfortunately, the narrow holding of Matter of A-R-C-G allowed
adjudicators in subsequent cases to disregard any guidance the BIA
provided in evaluating gender-based asylum claims, in particular
173
those involving intimate partner violence. The BIA did not pub174
lish subsequent determinations citing Matter of A-R-C-G-. However, a number of U.S. circuit courts, in published and unpublished
decisions, analyzed Matter of A-R-C-G-, as well as the interpretations
and applications of the case by immigration judges and the BIA.
Contrary to Attorney General Sessions’s assertion in his decision
that Matter of A-R-C-G- created confusion, the U.S. circuit courts,
the BIA, and immigration judges predominantly distinguished
Matter of A-R-C-G-, and few adjudicators favorably applied the case
175
for the asylum applicant.
Nevertheless, due to the Attorney General’s recent decision in
Matter of A-B-, gender-based asylum claims, including those involving intimate partner violence, have suffered a significant blow to
any limited progress that Matter of A-R-C-G- achieved.
II. MATTER OF A-B-: A RETURN TO THE
“PRIVATE MATTER” PERCEPTION
On June 11, 2018, in Matter of A-B-, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a decision overruling and vacating the BIA’s decision
in Matter of A-R-C-G-. 176 Sessions’s decision returned to a rejected
understanding of intimate partner violence inflicted against a fenon-state actor’s persecution occurred on account of the applicant’s membership in that
group, whether the applicant suffered past-persecution or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution, and the applicant’s credibility.
173. Zambrana, supra note 93, at 264 (arguing that Matter of A-R-C-G- has done little to
resolve the issues stemming from the fact that gender is not a protected category, such as
the inconsistencies of “piecemeal adjudication of gender-based claims”); see generally Bookey, supra note 167 (discussing immigration judges’ and BIA’s decisions post-A-R-C-G-).
174. Additionally, unpublished BIA determinations are not publicly available, which
makes the BIA’s application and interpretations of Matter of A-R-C-G- difficult to track.
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 142; Bookey, supra note 142, at 109–11.
175. See, e.g., Guzman-Alvarez v. Sessions, 701 F. App’x 54, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2017); Cardona v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 519, 520–21 (1st Cir. 2017); Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847,
853 (8th Cir. 2017); Jeronimo v. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2017);
Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2016); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34,
36 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Maldonado v. Lynch, 646 F. App’x 129, 131 (2d Cir. 2016) (denying petition for review of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen a woman’s case based on
the intervening Matter of A-R-C-G- decision because a change in the law did not entitle her to
a reopening and any change in the law would not resolve her failure to establish past domestic violence as determined by the BIA).
176. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
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male partner as a “private” or “personal” matter resulting solely
from the relationship of the parties. More specifically, Sessions revived the flawed analysis reflecting this perception in the BIA’s va177
cated decision in Matter of R-A-. He ignored entirely the underlying cause of intimate partner violence inflicted against female
partners: gender and subordination, or the abuser’s view that the
woman is subordinate to him in the relationship and the acceptance or reinforcement of that view by the society and cul178
ture. Sessions further completely disregarded over thirty years of
progress in U.S. domestic violence laws and training designed to
address the issues arising out of misconceptions and dynamics of
intimate partner violence.
The Attorney General justified his decision to overrule Matter of
A-R-C-G- by asserting that the BIA’s examination of the legal questions “lacked rigor and broke with the Board’s own precedents”
179
and, thus, the case was wrongly decided. Further, he argued that
the BIA should not have issued Matter of A-R-C-G- as a precedential
decision because DHS conceded most of the legal requirements
necessary to qualify for asylum. DHS concessions “should not set
180
precedential rules,” Sessions wrote.
177. Id. at 339.
178. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.); DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10., 14–16; DHS R-ABrief, supra note 62, at 26–28; Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review
of United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 58–59 (1998) (“[D]omestic violence is not about what a woman believes, but
about her gender identity—and the sexist beliefs of the man who abuses her. This cannot be
captured under the rubric of political opinion because . . . political opinion refers to the
victim’s beliefs, and not those of the persecutor.”); Suzanne Sidun, An End to the Violence:
Justifying Gender as a Particular Social Group, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 103, 138–39 (2000) (“The majority of women abroad are not raped or beaten because of a political opinion that they hold.
Women are raped and beaten because they are women.”).
179. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 333.
180. The Attorney General went even further to state that parties are not permitted to
stipulate to legal conclusions reserved for the court. While a court may not be bound by the
stipulations of the parties on questions of law, there is no prohibition against accepting such
stipulations in the court’s determination.
To state that parties cannot stipulate to issues for litigation is not only contrary to the
regulations, but entirely inefficient. In fact, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a) (2018) provides: “Prehearing conferences may be scheduled at the discretion of the Immigration Judge. The conference may be held to narrow issues, to obtain stipulations between the parties, to exchange information voluntarily, and otherwise to simplify and organize the proceeding.”
The Immigration Court Practice Manual also provides that “the parties are strongly encouraged to confer prior to a hearing in order to narrow issues for litigation.” IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 142, § 4.18(a), at 90. Cases are often decided using
the stipulations of the parties. Any agreement between the parties would be useless because
they would still need to present evidence and argument on that legal issue. Further, if a lawyer, such as a DHS attorney, believes that the law and facts support acknowledging that an
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The Attorney General further claimed that the Matter of A-R-C-Gopinion “caused confusion because it recognized an expansive new
category of particular social groups based on private violence.”181
He cited no decisions to support this “confusion” or the recognition of “an expansive new category of particular social groups.” In
addition, Sessions explained that the BIA’s decision in Matter of
A-B- and two other opinions treated A-R-C-G- as establishing a new
category of cognizable, particular social groups, specifically en182
compassing Central American domestic violence victims. While
adjudicators have not recognized a social group comprised of
“Central American domestic violence victims,” adjudicators, DHS,
and the international community have affirmed that women who
have suffered domestic violence in their countries may be able to
183
assert a viable claim for asylum.
Sessions further explained that several U.S. circuit courts have
expressed “skepticism” about Matter of A-R-C-G-. However, Sessions
misinterpreted the U.S. circuit courts’ analyses distinguishing
A-R-C-G-; the various opinions did not demonstrate the courts’
“skepticism” but, rather, showed the narrow holding of A-R-C-G-.
For example, A-R-C-G- is often distinguished because DHS conceded the cognizability of the particular social group and the persecu184
tion on account of that particular social group in the case. These
appellate court cases actually supported the view that A-R-C-G- did
asylum applicant has proven a particular issue in her case, it may contravene the rules of
professional conduct for that lawyer to continue to assert that issue. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). There is no requirement that the
BIA “write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that it consider the
issues raised and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to
perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d
105, 107 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir.
1987)).
181. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
182. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 332; (citing In re D-M-R- (B.I.A. June 9, 2015); In re E-M(B.I.A. Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/document/271353122/E-M-BIA-Feb-182015 (certain docket information redacted)).
183. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member,
dissenting); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken
from Eng.); UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra
note 62, at 13 n.10, 14–16; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 26–28; Bookey, supra note 142;
Coven Memorandum, supra note 69.
184. See, e.g., Menjivar-Sibrian v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-12207, 2018 WL 1415126, at *1 (11th
Cir. Mar. 22, 2018); Solorzano-De Maldonado v. Sessions, No. 16-60153, 2018 WL 1192988,
at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018); Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2018);
Guzman-Alvarez v. Sessions, No. 16-904, 701 F. App’x 54, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2017); Velasquez v.
Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2017); Cardona v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 519, 520–21 (1st
Cir. 2017); Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2017); Jeronimo v. Att’y
Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2017); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 36 (1st
Cir. 2016); Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 2016).
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not establish “an expansive new category of particular social
groups,” whether based on “private violence,” “Central American
domestic violence victims,” “Guatemalan women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” or any other particular social
group. In contradiction to Sessions’s view, the U.S. court of appeals
cases demonstrated that adjudicators continued to analyze asylum
185
claims on a case-by-case basis.
Matter of A-R-C-G- provided no change in the standards govern186
ing asylum or “rule of general applicability.” In Matter of A-B-,
Sessions cited no case in which adjudicators questioned or even
challenged the determination in Matter of A-R-C-G-. His determination to overrule the case is in stark contrast to his reliance on the
BIA’s determinations that have been vacated by an attorney general (Matter of R-A-) or questioned by U.S. circuit courts (Matters of
M-E-V-G- and W-R-G-).
Despite Sessions’s generalized statements on the viability of hypothetical asylum claims, these claims must be adjudicated based
on the facts and circumstances of each case, as opposed to a com187
plete rejection of such claims. As such, Sessions’s decision does
188
not preclude asylum claims involving intimate partner violence.
Nevertheless, the Attorney General’s reliance on hypothetical
characterizations of particular social groups in the Matter of A-Bdecision creates more confusion in the adjudication of genderbased asylum claims, in particular those involving intimate partner
violence.
Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s assertions to the contrary, his decision provides no clarity on the adjudication of asylum
claims involving “a victim of private criminal activity” or any asylum

185. See cases cited in notes 175, 185.
186. The BIA noted that “in cases where concessions are not made and accepted as binding, these issues will be decided based on the particular facts and evidence on a case-by-case
basis as addressed by the Immigration Judge in the first instance.” In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Furthermore, “[i]n particular, the issue of nexus will depend on the facts and circumstances of an
individual claim.” Id.
187. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec.
211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987);
CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, MATTER OF A-B-: CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY 6, 13
(2018) [hereinafter CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform); NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING
FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 14 (2018), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/
default/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf [hereinafter NIJC PRACTICE
ADVISORY].
188. NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187.
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claim involving persecution by a non-state actor. In fact, Sessions’s
decision raises issues arising out of three key elements of the refugee definition: (1) membership in a particular social group; (2)
nexus; and (3) past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
189
persecution. The ambiguities in Sessions’ decision will also negatively impact credibility determinations in gender-based asylum
claims.
Moreover, the policies established by the Attorney General in
190
the Matter of A-B- decision are likely to be contested in the future.
Additional challenges are further likely to be made based on the
Attorney General’s lack of authority to issue this decision and a vio191
lation of Ms. A-B-’s due process rights.
189. On July 11, 2018, shortly after the Matter of A-B- decision, the USCIS issued a Policy
Memorandum titled, “Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and
Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-.” (DHS Policy Memorandum). The DHS
Policy Memorandum is intended to provide guidance to USCIS officers in determining who
is eligible for asylum and refugee status based on Matter of A-B- and applies to asylum and
refugee officers processing reasonable fear, credible fear, asylum, and refugee claims. Since
this policy memo primarily follows the policies established in Matter of A-B-, it also raises issues regarding the three key elements of the refugee definition. Additionally, as discussed in
further detail below, at least one court has recently found that aspects of this memo go beyond the policies set forth in Matter of A-B- decision and incorrectly interpret and apply the
decision. See Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19,
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
190. See e.g., Grace, 2018 WL 6628081, at *36.
191. In addition to the issues raised in the Attorney General’s opinion related to the refugee definition, the decision disregards procedural regulations and violates due process.
This may call into question the precedential value and even the validity of the decision. See
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 4 n.7. Ms. A-B-’s brief, as well as a brief from
sixteen former immigration judges and members of the BIA, informed the Attorney General
that the BIA could not refer Matter of A-B- because the case was not under the jurisdiction of
the BIA in the absence of an order from the immigration judge. Rather, they urged the Attorney General to remand the case to the BIA to respond to the immigration judge’s order.
See Brief for Respondent, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://
uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291241595459 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent A-B-] (certain docket information redacted); Brief of Sixteen
Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) [hereinafter “IJ
and
BIA
Amicus
Brief”],
https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz
4rname4bk29s7/file/291245779320.
Although the Attorney General acknowledged that the immigration judge’s certification order was procedurally defective, he rejected this request. Sessions argued that there is
nothing in the federal regulation that prevents him from referring a case for review “simply
because the Board has remanded the case for further processing before an immigration
judge,” and his authority to review was not restricted to “final” decisions of the BIA. In re
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 324. However, Attorney General Sessions ignored the issue that the
BIA must refer the decision to the attorney general upon his direction, and if the BIA does
not have jurisdiction over the decision, it lacks the power to refer the case to the Attorney
General. See Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra, at 18–20 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i)
(2018), which requires the Board to “refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision
all cases that [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.”); North Carolina
Growers’ Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must be strict in reviewing
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Indeed, in the recent decision, Grace v. Whitaker, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia addressed challenges to the policies established in Matter of A-B- and the DHS Policy Memoran192
dum. The plaintiffs—twelve adults and children from Central
American countries—gave accounts of domestic and gang violence
in their countries, including sexual abuse, kidnappings, and beatings. The plaintiffs were placed in the expedited removal process,
and asylum officers conducted credible fear interviews. The asylum
officers found their stories to be credible but issued negative credible fear determinations for each plaintiff, applying the policies set
forth in Matter of A-B- and the DHS Policy Memorandum. Upon review, an immigration judge affirmed the asylum officers’ findings.
Final orders of removal were entered against the plaintiffs, and
they sought the district court’s review of the expedited removal orders issued because of the negative credible fear determinations.
The court, exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii), found certain policies for expedited review of
credible fear determinations contained in Matter of A-B- and the
DHS Policy Memorandum to be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary
193
to the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). First, it
rejected the general rule against finding credible fear in cases
based on domestic violence victims’ and gang-related victims’
194
membership in a particular social group. Second, it rejected the
heightened standard of “condoned” or “complete helplessness” to
establish non-state actor persecution instead of the “unable or un195
willing” standard. Third, it rejected the DHS Policy Memorandum’s circularity standard, prohibiting recognition of domesticviolence-based social groups, which include the characteristic of
196
“inability to leave.” Fourth, it rejected the delineation requirement in a credible fear interview established in the DHS Policy
197
Memorandum. Finally, it rejected the DHS Policy Memorandum’s requirement that adjudicators disregard any U.S. circuit
court law that is inconsistent with Matter of A-B- and apply only the
law of the U.S. circuit court in which the credible fear interview is

an agency’s compliance with procedural rules.”); see also IJ and BIA Amicus Brief, supra, at
10.
192. Grace, 2018 WL 6628081, at *36.
193. Id. at *13–14, *19–21, *27.
194. Id. at *20.
195. Id. at *21–23.
196. Id. at *24–25.
197. Id. at *26–27.
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held. 198 The court further entered a permanent injunction preventing the government from applying these policies to credible fear
determinations, vacated plaintiffs’ credible fear determinations
and removal orders, and ordered the government to return the
removed plaintiffs to the United States and provide new credible
fear proceedings, applying the correct legal standards, for all plain199
tiffs.
Although Grace v. Whitaker is limited to the application of these
policies in the context of credible fear determinations prior to an
asylum adjudication, similar challenges may be successful in the
context of affirmative and defensive asylum adjudications. In other
words, Grace v. Whitaker dealt the first blow to Attorney General
Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B-, but the decision is in the appeal process. Therefore, Matter of A-B- still requires critical examination.
A. The Facts of Matter of A-BIn his decision, the Attorney General referenced the facts asserted by Ms. A-B- in one sentence: “The respondent asserted that her
ex-husband, with whom she shares three children, repeatedly
abused her physically, emotionally, and sexually during and after
200
their marriage.” The Attorney General made no mention of
hundreds of pages of evidence of Ms. A-B-’s abuse and the lack of
201
protection from the government.
Ms. A-B-, a citizen of El Salvador, applied for asylum to escape a
man—her husband and father of her three children—who had
202
abused her for the past fifteen years. He beat and raped her on a
constant basis. He threatened to kill her with a loaded gun and a
knife. In one instance, while she was pregnant, he threatened to
hang her. He forced her to serve him as a slave. In order to ensure
her fidelity to him, he would order her to show him her genitals so
he could examine whether she had been with another man.
Ms. A-B- attempted to obtain protection from the police. Notably, her husband’s brother was a police officer. Although she secured two restraining orders against her husband, the police made

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at *27–31.
Id. at *36.
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 at 321.
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 8.
Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 2–3.
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no effort to enforce them. In fact, the police required her to serve
the restraining orders on her husband herself, exposing her to severe risk of physical harm and death. The abuse continued. Ms.
A-B-’s husband came after her with a knife and, when she sought
protection from the police, they refused to help, informing her instead that she should leave the town. She moved to a town two
hours away from her husband. The abuse continued once her husband found her. Despite constant threats to her life from her husband, Ms. A-B- secured a divorce. Even after the divorce, her exhusband and his brother, the police officer, confronted her and
threatened her life. Shortly before she fled to the United States,
203
her husband found her again and beat her.
Regardless, the Attorney General vacated the BIA’s decision in
Matter of A-B- and remanded the case to the immigration judge for
204
further proceedings consistent with his determination. The next
sections analyze the Attorney General’s decision and its impact regarding three key elements of the refugee definition: membership
in a particular social group, nexus, and past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution in conjunction with the applicant’s credibility.
B. Particular Social Group
The Attorney General’s opinion sought to address the question
of whether “a victim of private criminal activity constitutes persecu205
tion on account of membership in a particular social group.”
Neither Matter of A-R-C-G- nor Matter of A-B- identified a social
group comprised of “victims of private criminal activity,” “victims of
206
domestic violence,” or “victims of intimate partner violence.”
Nevertheless, the Attorney General analyzed whether these conceptions of social groups met the definition of a particular social
group.
Despite the Attorney General’s unsubstantiated statement that,
in general, asylum claims based on domestic violence perpetrated

203. Id. at 6.
204. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
205. Id. at 325.
206. Brief of Sixteen Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 15, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316
(A.G. 2018), https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/
291245779320.; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936) (courts
cannot issue “an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts”).
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by non-state actors will not qualify for asylum, he did not state that
207
domestic violence may never serve as a basis for an asylum claim.
Any such statement would have been contrary to BIA precedent
including Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of Acosta, which provide that
whether an applicant has established her membership in a particu208
lar social group is a determination made on a case-by-case basis.
Rather, Sessions took issue with Matter of A-R-C-G- because of the
BIA’s lack of deep analysis due to DHS’s concessions. In particular,
Sessions faulted the BIA’s failure to explain how the evidence presented in the case met the three elements that define a particular
209
social group—immutability, particularity, and social distinction.

207. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 320. Since Matter of A-B-, U.S. circuit courts have recognized
both that the overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G- does not necessarily prevent the recognition of
a particular social group based on nationality, gender, relationship status, and inability to
leave as cognizable, and that the overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G- in general means such
groups are not cognizable. See e.g., Padilla-Maldonado v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-3097, 2018 WL
4896385, at *5 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2018) (finding the overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G- in Matter of
A-B- does not automatically defeat applicant’s claim that she is a member of a cognizable
particular social group); Najera v. Whitaker, 745 Fed. App’x 670, 671 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding that under Matter of A-B-, the group identified as “Salvadorean females unable to leave a
domestic relationship” may not be cognizable); Martinez-Martinez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x
629, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Matter of A-B- and finding that although the facts “supported” that applicant was able to safely leave her husband and live in another village in this
case, “[w]e would not agree that every woman who is able to escape her husband thereby
removes herself from the social group of women who are unable to leave their relationship,
or thereby severs the nexus between her group and the persecution she suffers.”); TicasGuillen v. Whitaker, 744 F. App’x 410, 411 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that remand to the BIA
is required to consider whether the proposed social group is cognizable in light of Matter of
A-B-, but stating that the immigration judge’s denial finding the proposed social group was
“‘just too broad’ . . . cannot stand” and recognizing that gender and nationality can form a
particular social group under the law).
In Grace v. Whitaker, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found
that Matter of A-B- and the DHS Policy Memorandum established a general rule against finding credible fear in cases based on domestic violence and gang-related claims. No. 18-cv01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). Interestingly, the government argued that there was no such general rule established by Matter of A-B- and the Matter of A-B- decision only prohibited a party’s
concession to satisfy an element of an asylum claim while the remaining statements were
mere commentary. Id. at *19. Nevertheless, the court in Grace found that a general rule was
articulated and this general rule “effectively bar[ring] the claims based on certain categories
of persecutors” constituted an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the term “particular
social group” because it is inconsistent with Congress’s intent to bring U.S. law into conformance with the 1967 Protocol and the requirement of case-by-case adjudication of credible fear determinations. Id. at *20.
208. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec.
211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
209. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 318–20.
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1. The BIA’s Definition of a
Particular Social Group Remains Unchanged
The Attorney General recognized the BIA’s immutable characteristic definition of membership in a particular social group set
forth in Matter of Acosta. However, he relied on the BIA’s articulation of the three elements for establishing membership in a particular social group in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-:
membership in a group, (1) whose members share a common immutable characteristic, (2) that is defined with particularity and
210
(3) that is socially distinct within the society in question. This
definition includes Matter of Acosta’s immutable characteristic requirement as an element, but adds the two additional elements of
particularity and social distinction. The Attorney General made no
change in the requirements set forth in these cases but asserted
that because “particular social group” is ambiguous, the Attorney
General and the BIA have “primary responsibility for construing”
211
this provision.
The Attorney General and the BIA, however, do not have unrestricted power to construe the definition of “particular social
group.” In fact, the U.S. circuit courts must determine if an agency’s interpretation of an “ambiguous” statutory provision is a “per212
missible construction of the statute.” The BIA cannot adjudicate
asylum claims based on a particular social group “inconsistently” or
213
“irrationally.” Although the BIA may add new requirements to its
definition of a particular social group, it must provide a “principled reason” for its departure from its precedent in Matter of
214
Acosta.
210. Id. at 330–31.
211. Id. at 326–27.
212. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603, 612 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Chevron, USA, Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). In Grace v.
Whitaker, the court found that although the term “particular social group” was ambiguous,
Matter of A-B-’s and the DHS Policy Memorandum’s interpretation of this term was not a
permissible construction of the statute and was arbitrary and capricious. Grace, 2018 WL
6628081, at *20.
213. Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (“Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation
of ‘particular social group’ Chevron deference in Fatin, this did not give the agency license to
thereafter adjudicate claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally. Agencies
are not free, under Chevron, to generate erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of their governing statutes . . . . Consistency over time and across subjects is a relevant factor [under Chevron] when deciding whether the agency’s current interpretation is ‘reasonable.’”)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 608. The court in Grace v. Whitaker further provided extensive discussion rejecting the DHS Policy Memorandum’s instruction to asylum officers to ignore inconsistent
U.S. circuit court decisions. The court explained that an agency’s interpretation of a provi-
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Nevertheless, the Attorney General made no mention of the de215
cisions in the Seventh Circuit on whether the requirements established by the BIA in these cases of “particularity” and “social distinction” is a permissible construction of “particular social group.”
216
These requirements are repetitive and confusing. As described
below, the definition of a particular social group should more
closely follow Acosta and UNHCR guidelines, which are in accord217
ance with the principle of ejusdem generis.
2. The Particular Social Groups Exist Independently
from the Harm
Attorney General Sessions wrote in his A-B- decision that had the
BIA applied the M-E-V-G- social group requirements with the appropriate analysis, the social group would not have been cognizable. Sessions determined that a particular social group “must ‘exist
independently’ of the harm asserted” in the asylum claim.218 The
risk of being persecuted cannot be the characteristic shared by the

sion may only replace a prior court interpretation if the interpretation is entitled to Chevron
deference and the agency interpretation is reasonable. Grace, 2018 WL 6628081, at *28 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’s Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). If
an interpretation is not afforded deference, the agency is bound by the court’s interpretation even if the agency’s interpretation is contrary to that of the court. Id. at *29.
215. The Seventh Circuit has refused to apply the requirements of “particularity” and
“social visibility/distinction.” See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2013); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
216. See also S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 553 (3d Cir. 2018) (acknowledging that
the requirements of “social distinction” and “particularity” overlap); Cece, 733 F.3d at 674,
677 (finding the “breadth of the social group says nothing about the requirements
for asylum”); Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615 (noting the “social visibility” criterion “makes no
sense”); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (noting that there is some degree of overlap between the particularity and social distinction requirements because both
take societal context into account), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I & N. Dec. 227, 241 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing they “overlap because the overall definition is applied in the fact-specific context of
an applicant’s claim for relief”); Zambrana, supra note 93.
217. See Castillo Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Acosta strikes
an acceptable balance between (1) rendering ‘particular social group’ a catch-all for all
groups who might claim persecution, which would render the other four categories meaningless, and (2) rendering ‘particular social group’ a nullity by making its requirements too
stringent or too specific.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in
part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Paraketsova, supra note 92; Zambrana, supra note 93.
218. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334–35 (A.G. 2018) (citing In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 227, 236 n.11, 243 (B.I.A. 2014)), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853
(EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018); see also Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881
F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2018); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003); In re W-GR-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215 (B.I.A. 2014).
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group. 219 He stated that the particular social group identified in AR-C-G-, “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship,” failed because such a group is “effectively defined” as “women in Guatemala who are victims of domestic
220
abuse.” Specifically, the group was defined by the risk of persecution as a woman’s inability to leave was created by the harm or
221
threatened harm.
Contrary to the Attorney General’s categorization, the “inability
to leave” does not constitute “persecution.” The subjugation of
women in society or culture creates the situation in which a woman
222
may be unable to leave a relationship. The BIA in Matter of
A-R-C-G- specifically recognized that “a married woman’s inability
to leave the relationship may be informed by societal expectations
about gender and subordination, as well as legal constraints regarding divorce and separation,” and cited to numerous U.S. gov223
ernment sources supporting this conclusion. The Attorney General ignored this explanation provided by the BIA. Rather, he
dismissed A-R-C-G-, finding that it failed to consider whether the
group identified “was effectively defined” as women in Guatemala
who are victims of domestic abuse because their inability to leave
was created by the harm. The BIA had no reason to consider this
question because it found that inability to leave might result from
societal expectations about gender and subordination.
Regardless, the definition of a particular social group does not
require “complete independence” from the characteristic of the
224
persecution suffered. Although members of a group may all

219. See Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
220. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335.
221. Id.
222. Brief of Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 31–32; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief,
supra note 62, at 14–15; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62; Nanasi, supra note 137, at 746–51.
223. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393–95 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing In re W-G-R-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. at 214) (observing that, in evaluating a group’s particularity, it may be necessary to
take into account the social and cultural context of the alien’s country of citizenship or nationality), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 111TH
CONG., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 2598 (Joint Comm. Print
2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT62931/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT62931.
pdf; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Guatemala – 2008 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2008/wha/119161.htm.
224. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2013); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 12 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007); In re W-G-R-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215 (B.I.A. 2014); Cece, 733 F.3d at 671)); NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 13, 17 (citing Cece, 733 F.3d at 671; Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d
Cir. 2003)). The court in Grace v. Whitaker found that the DHS Policy Memorandum went
“well beyond the Attorney General’s explanation” of circularity in Matter of A-B-. No. 18-cv-
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share the characteristic of suffering persecution, this does not prevent the recognition of a particular social group. This is because
other components of the group’s characteristics may establish the
225
existence of a particular social group. If only particular social
groups that have complete independence from the persecution
suffered could be considered cognizable, many previously granted
asylum claims would no longer meet the requirements of a cog226
nizable social group. For instance, in Matter of Kasinga, women
who fear or have experienced female genital mutilation comprised
the social group of “[y]oung women who are members of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been
subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe,
227
and who oppose the practice.” Moreover, in Matter of M-E-V-G-,
the BIA specifically recognized that Matter of Kasinga, which involved an applicant who was opposed to the practice of FGM, illustrated that a group may be socially distinct without ocular visibility.
The BIA explained that a society could still perceive such women
to comprise a particular social group for many reasons including,
228
the sociopolitical or cultural conditions of the country.
As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Cece v. Holder, “it is not
fair to conclude that the group is defined by the harm or potential
harm inflicted merely by the language used rather than determining what underlying characteristics account for the fear and vul01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *25 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). The court found that the DHS Policy Memorandum’s statement
that “a particular social group defined solely by the ability to leave a relationship” would not
be “sufficiently particular” to be to be an incorrect interpretation of the circularity standard
and analysis of Matter of A-B-. It also found that it was an incorrect interpretation of the circularity standard and analysis of Matter of A-B- to argue that, “even if ‘unable to leave’ were
particular, the applicant must show something more than the danger of harm from an
abuser if the applicant tried to leave because that would amount to circularly defining the
particular social group by the harm on which the asylum claim is based.” Id. The court explained that such a “general circularity rule foreclosing such claims” is arbitrary, capricious
and contrary to immigration law as it fails to consider the facts presented in each case. Id.
Moreover, it changes settled law, which recognizes that if a group contains characteristics
independent of the persecution, it may be recognized as a particular social group, but fails
to provide a reasoned explanation for the change. Id.
225. Cece, 733 F.3d at 671.
226. Id. (citing Agbor v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2007); Sarhan v. Holder,
658 F.3d 649, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2011)) (noting other recognized particular social groups that
included the shared trait of suffering persecution) (explanatory parentheticals omitted);
Reply Brief for Respondent at 15, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://
uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291288954047 [hereinafter Reply Brief for Respondent A-B-] (arguing that if a particular social group that is defined in part by the harm feared is never cognizable, “it would throw into doubt the availability of asylum to applicants who suffered or fear female genital mutilation.”).
227. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
228. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240–41 (B.I.A. 2014).
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nerability.”229 Attorney General Sessions failed to consider the “underlying characteristics” that cause the group’s fear and vulnerability. The group holds the common, immutable characteristics of being “married,” “women,” “in Guatemala,” “unable to leave their
230
relationship.” This group’s fear and vulnerability stems from the
subordination of women in Guatemala and the view of married
231
women as “property.” Further, even assuming the Attorney General was correct that the inability to leave a relationship is a situation created by the harm or threat of harm, he cannot “tease out
one component of a group’s characteristics to defeat the definition
232
of a social group.”
A particular social group defined by nationality, gender, relationship status, and the inability to leave is not new and is a conception that has been offered and accepted as cognizable by DHS
233
itself. In Matter of L-R-, DHS asserted that “the particular social
group in asylum and withholding of removal claims based on domestic violence is best defined in light of the evidence about how
the respondent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within
234
the domestic relationship.” DHS further proposed potential articulations of a particular social group in an asylum case based on
intimate partner violence, which may meet the requirements for a
particular social group if adequately established in the record.
These include: “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are
unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as property by
235
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”
229. Cece, 733 F.3d at 672.
230. Id. at 673 (“Neither their age, gender, nationality, or living situation are alterable.”).
231. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[A] married woman’s inability to leave the relationship may be informed by societal expectations about gender
and subordination, as well as legal constraints regarding divorce and separation.”), overruled
by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at
14 (recognizing that a group articulated as “Mexican women who are viewed as property by
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship” may meet the requirements for a
particular social group.); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 37–38 (asserting that
“Salvadoran women who are treated as property by virtue of their positions in their domestic
relationships” constitutes a particular social group); see also In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906,
929 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note
62.
232. Cece, 733 F.3d at 673 (citing Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2011)).
233. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 7 n.21 (noting that since 2004, DHS
has recognized that gender, nationality, and relationship status may form a particular social
group); see DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10, 14; DHS R-A- Brief, supra
note 62.
234. DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 14.
235. Id.
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In regard to “social visibility/distinction,” DHS recognized that
social distinction might be demonstrated if evidence reflects a societal view that “the status of a woman in a domestic relationship
places the woman into a segment of society that will not be accord236
ed protection from harm inflicted by a domestic partner.” Further, such a social group may be sufficiently “particular” based on
how a domestic relationship is defined within the society, such as
237
through laws criminalizing domestic violence.
Moreover, the facts of A-R-C-G- and A-B- both support cognizable
social groups applying the three-element analysis.
a. Immutability
The Attorney General’s only argument regarding immutability
appeared to be that a particular social group cannot be defined by
the persecution of its members. As discussed above, the group
“women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” is not
defined by the persecution of its members. Moreover, gender, nationality, relationship status, perception as property, and living sit238
uation are immutable characteristics.

236. Id. at 18.
237. Id. at 18–19.
238. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing gender, nationality, and youth as immutable characteristics); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667
(9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that women in a particular country can constitute a particular social group, regardless of ethnicity or clan membership); Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d
1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that widowed Cameroonian women constitute a particular social group); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Iranian women who refuse to conform to their government’s gender-specific laws and social norms may
satisfy the Acosta standard); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929 (B.I.A. 2000) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996)
(treating gender and tribal identity as immutable characteristics); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (establishing that “membership in a particular social group” refers to common immutable characteristics), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL)
(appeal taken from Eng.); see also UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, ¶ 30. DHS
Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 14 (recognizing that a group articulated as “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship” may meet the requirements for a particular social group); Brief for Respondent AB-, supra note 190, at 37–38 (asserting that “Salvadoran women who are treated as property
by virtue of their positions in their domestic relationships” constitutes a particular social
group); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62.
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b. Particularity
The Attorney General asserted that the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-Gfailed to consider whether the terms “married,” “women,” and
“unable to leave the relationship” considered together constitute a
discrete social group. Principally, he claimed that the BIA did not
provide an analysis to show that the proposed group was “defined
by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining
who falls within the group.” 239 He then made the conclusory assertion that “[s]ocial groups defined by their vulnerability to private
criminal activity likely lack the particularity required under M-E-VG-, given that broad swaths of society may be susceptible to victimi240
zation.” In dicta, he cited the example of those who are victims of
241
gang violence.
Women who suffer persecution in the form of intimate partner
violence are not victims of “private criminal activity” any more than
242
women who are subjected to or refuse to be subjected to FGM.
The Attorney General missed the underlying reasons for this
group’s vulnerability: the subordinate position of women in the society, the subordinate position of women in domestic relationships
in the society, the treatment of women in domestic relationships as
beneath government protection. Persecution by a private person,
or non-state actor, still may constitute persecution if the government is unwilling or unable to provide protection to the targeted
243
group.
As explained in Matters of M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, “the terms used
to describe the group” must have “commonly accepted definitions
244
in the society of which the group is a part.” Evidence that supports legal definitions of the terms used to describe the social
group, such as “domestic relationship,” “married,” “women,” “unable to leave the relationship,” and “children in common,” would
presumably also support the argument that they have “commonly

239. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335 (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239
(B.I.A. 2014)).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 246; In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365–66.
243. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 22 (“If the Attorney General is asking
whether criminal acts committed by private (non-State) actors may constitute persecution, a
contrary ruling would fly in the face of decades of precedent, the plain language of the statute, and the clear intent of Congress.”).
244. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239; In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A.
2014).
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accepted definitions in the society.” 245 Further, the social and cultural context of the applicant’s country may be taken into account
in evaluating a group’s particularity. The inability of a married
woman or a woman in a domestic/intimate partner relationship to
leave may be defined by “societal expectations about gender and
subordination,” legal constraints on divorce and separation, child
custody, and a lack of protections for women and their children
246
who want to leave a relationship.
Even if there are legal protections, police often refuse to assist
women experiencing intimate partner violence because of societal
expectations about gender, subordination, and interference with
247
marital relationships. This evidences that a group defined by nationality, gender, relationship status, and inability to leave the relationship is accepted by the society as a clearly defined group, which
is subordinate to men and outside of the government’s protec248
tion. There is nothing amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective about these groups. The Attorney General provided no reasonable explanation why such groups are amorphous, overbroad,
diffuse, or subjective.
c. Social Distinction
Attorney General Sessions asserted that these social group constructs “will often lack sufficient social distinction to be cognizable
249
as a distinct social group.” In support of his conclusion, Sessions
cited
the
BIA’s
vacated
decision
in
Matter
of
R-A- as holding that the applicant failed to show that her social
group was a segment of the population that was recognized by the

245. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–93 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); see Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 37–38.
246. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93. Matter of A-B- involved social groups identified as “El Salvadoran women in domestic relationships they are unable to leave,” “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children
in common,” or “Salvadoran women.” In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320, 343 (A.G. 2018),
abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19,
2018); see Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 32, 37–38.
247. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93; see Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note
190, at 37–38, see DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 17.
248. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93. In regard to particularity, the BIA requires that a particular social group “be defined by characteristics that provide a clear
benchmark for determining who falls within the group.” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at
239.
249. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.
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society. 250 The Attorney General’s reliance on a case that was vacated by a previous Attorney General is problematic. Although Matter
of R-A- may represent the BIA’s position in one instance, a previous
Attorney General determined that the position was erroneous and
vacated it. In fact, in the final remand of the case, the immigration
251
judge actually granted asylum. Moreover, the BIA’s analysis is
contrary to DHS’s later position taken in the same case that she did
qualify for asylum. DHS took similar positions in subsequent cases,
and the issue became the impetus for drafting new proposed regu252
lations addressing gender-based asylum.
Sessions further stated, “there is significant room for doubt” that
a society would view these women as a distinct group as opposed to
253
a victim of private abuse. He claimed that the BIA in Matter of
A-R-C-G- failed to explain why the evidence established that Guatemalan society perceives “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship” as a group distinct in the socie254
ty. The Attorney General argued that evidence demonstrating
social distinction must include that the society “perceives, considers or recognizes [persons sharing the particular characteristic] to
255
be a distinct group.” He ignored that the BIA in M-E-V-G- recognized that it may not be possible to identify women who are opposed to FGM, but a society could still perceive them as a group
256
based on “sociopolitical or cultural conditions in the country.”
Likewise, the sociopolitical and cultural conditions in a country
may demonstrate the society’s perception of women who are in
domestic relationships and unable to leave as a group. The society
perceives the status of the woman in the relationship as subordinate to that of the man even if she attempts to physically separate
from him. As such, societal expectations are that abuse against the

250. Id. The Attorney General asserted that the BIA’s decision was “thorough” and “wellreasoned” and that “the Board and federal courts have continued to treat [the BIA’s analysis
in Matter of R-A-] as persuasive.” Id. at 319, 328.
251. Nanasi, supra note 137, at 746–51 (describing the series of events leading DHS to
reverse its position in Matter of R-A-).
252. Id.; see DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10, 14; DHS R-A- Brief,
supra note 62.
253. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citing In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014)). This does not mean
ocular visibility. To the extent the Attorney General applied the social distinction requirement set forth in Matter of M-E-V-G- in such a manner, it was contrary to the BIA’s articulation of this requirement. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240–41 (B.I.A. 2014).
256. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238–40.
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group is tolerated. 257 The fear and vulnerability of this group stems
from the subordination of women in the country and the view of
married women as “property.”
As further recognized by the BIA in M-E-V-G-, evidence supporting the prevalence of FGM in the society and the expectation that
women of the tribe would undergo FGM demonstrated the social
258
distinction of the group. Similarly, evidence supporting the prevalence of intimate partner violence in the society and the acceptance of the abuse of women in the society demonstrates the
social distinction of the group. Women understand that they are a
part of this group, as they know the government or police will not
provide protection. The BIA in M-E-V-G- further provided an instructive list of evidence that may establish that a group is perceived by society as distinct including “country conditions reports,
expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws
259
and policies, historical animosities, and the like.” Such evidence
was presented in Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, including
country conditions reports from U.S. congressional committees
and the U.S. State Department and press accounts of the culture of
family violence and machismo. Further, experts provided testimony
on the prevalence of domestic violence, sexual offenses against
women, and the failure of police to enforce laws against domestic
260
violence in the women’s respective countries.
Unsurprisingly, the Attorney General ignored both the respondent’s articulation of the particular social group in Matter of
A-B- as “Salvadoran women” and the respondent’s argument that
gender alone may establish a particular social group. The BIA and
U.S. circuit courts have recognized particular social groups comprised of women, including the BIA’s recognition of “sex” in Matter
261
of Acosta as an immutable characteristic forming a social group.
U.S. circuit courts have recognized Iranian women, Somali women,
female members of a tribe, and widows in Cameroon as particular

257. For an illustration of DHS’s prior position on social visibility/distinction, see DHS
Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 8, 14.
258. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 246.
259. Id. at 244.
260. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 331–32; In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A.
2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); see Brief for Respondent A-B-,
supra note 190, at 36–37.
261. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that the shared
characteristic of sex may form a particular social group and persecution may be directed
toward an individual who is a member of such a particular social group), overruled in part by
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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social groups. 262 Jeff Sessions took extraordinary measures to analyze the applicant’s membership in a particular social group utiliz263
ing the narrowest interpretations possible.
C. Nexus
The Attorney General asserted that DHS’s concession in Matter
of A-R-C-G- that the applicant was persecuted on account of her
particular social group comprised of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” was contrary to the
facts of the case and other cases. In support of this conclusion, he
relied on the analysis in a vacated BIA decision, Matter of R-A-, and
ignored actual precedent on the issue. Relying on Matter of R-A-, he
argued that the abuser in Matter of A-R-C-G- attacked the applicant
because of a “preexisting personal relationship” and not because
“he was aware of, and hostile to,” her particular social group. Sessions cited the BIA’s explanation in Matter of R-A- that evidence did
not demonstrate that the applicant’s husband had animosity towards the group as a whole or that the persecutor was aware of the
264
existence of the group.
First, the Attorney General attempted to return the understanding of intimate partner violence against women to one based on a
265
motive that is personal to the relationship. Experts have discredited the idea that a man beats his female partner simply because
266
they are in a relationship. Intimate partner violence against
262. See cases cited supra note 78 and accompanying text.
263. The Attorney General further instructed that the BIA, immigration judges, and all
asylum officers must require an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based
on membership in a particular social group to provide, “on the record and before the immigration judge, the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.” The Attorney General instructed that the BIA cannot consider a social group articulation that was not
first presented to or analyzed by the immigration judge. See In re A-B-, 27 I. &. N. Dec. at
344. In Grace v. Whitaker, the court recognized that although Matter of A-B- does not apply
this exact delineation requirement to a credible fear determination, the DHS Policy Memorandum does apply such a requirement to a credible fear determination. No. 18-cv-01853
(EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *20 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). The court found the DHS Policy Memorandum’s exact delineation requirement in the context of a credible fear determination to be contrary to immigration
law, arbitrary and capricious. Id.
264. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338–39.
265. Id.
266. See note 178 supra; Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39–40; Reply Brief
for Respondent A-B-, supra note 226, at 8 (quoting Expert Declaration of Nancy Lemon
¶¶ 2, 81) (opining that “gender is one of the main motivating factors, if not the primary factor, for domestic violence” and that the specific facts in this case establish that “gender was
the primary motivating factor of [the] batterer’s abuse”). While the Reply Brief is publicly
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women occurs because of the abuser’s perception that the woman
is subordinate to him, and this perception is reinforced by the so267
ciety’s acceptance of her subordinate status in the relationship.
The requisite nexus can still be established where there is a preex268
isting personal relationship. Concluding otherwise would prevent
eligibility for asylum for women who have suffered or refused FGM
imposed by family members or women who flee honor killings by
269
family members. A blanket assertion that a preexisting relationship prevents nexus is in conflict with the requirements that asylum determinations be made based on the context in which the
270
persecution occurred and rely on the evidence presented.
There is no requirement that a persecutor must seek to harm all
group members in order to establish nexus. The question of nexus

available, the appended Expert Declaration does not appear to be publicly available besides
the excerpts in the Reply Brief. See also NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 21 (“it is
well established that domestic violence is rooted in power and control.”); Robins, supra note
36, at 436–37; Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; Musalo, A Short History, supra note 44, at
49; see also Taylor Markey, Comment, Westernized Women?: The Construction of Muslim Women’s
Dissent in U.S. Asylum Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1302, 1322 (2017) (stating that in asylum law
and international human rights law, “gender has been historically depoliticized—cast as private, personal, and cultural”).
267. See sources cited supra note 252.
268. Reply Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 226, at 8 n.4 (citing Faruk v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“There is no exception to the asylum statute for violence
from family members; if the government is unable or unwilling to control persecution, it
matters not who inflicts it.”); Brief of Tahirih Justice Center, the Asian Pacific Institute on
Gender-Based Violence, ASISTA Immigration Assistance, and Casa de Esperanza as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (B.I.A. 2018) (quoting
Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2010)) (“[If] there is a nexus between the
persecution and the membership in a particular social group, the simultaneous existence of
a personal dispute does not eliminate that nexus.”), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 17–18, 21; NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 20 (asserting that Sessions’s analysis of the persecution suffered by A-R-C-G- as harm occurring exclusively in the
context of a personal relationship “ignores established sociological evidence regarding domestic violence and country condition evidence regarding gender violence in Central America.”).
269. See Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that the threat of
honor killing against Ms. Sarhan by her brother was not based on a “personal dispute,” but
on “a widely-held social norm in Jordan” entitling “male members of families dishonored by
perceived bad acts of female relatives to kill those women.”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec.
357, 366–67 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that nexus was established because aunt and husband
planned to force Ms. Kasinga to undergo FGM to overcome sexual characteristics of young
women in order to assure male dominance and exploitation); Reply Brief for Respondent
A-B-, supra note 226, at 8, n.4.
270. Id.; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 20; NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 20; see Martinez-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33, 40 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding
that the applicant’s comparison to Matter of A-R-C-G- “does her no favors” because Matter of
A-B- overruled A-R-C-G- and interpreted “the ‘causal connection’ and ‘government nexus’
prongs of persecution analysis to exclude most domestic violence harms from satisfying that
definition.”).
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concerns the abuser’s motives in harming his spouse or partner.271
272
This is a fact acknowledged by U.S. circuit courts and DHS. Further, such a requirement is illogical. If a society allows members of
one race to hold members of another race in slavery and a slave
owner beats his own slave, but not other slaves, this does not prevent a finding that the slave owner was motivated by his slave’s race
273
in beating him. Nor does a neo-Nazi burning down the house of
only one African-American prevent a finding that he was motivated
274
by the person’s race in burning down the house.
Moreover, there is no requirement that a persecutor must be
aware of the legally defined particular social group, “married
275
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”

271. Reply Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 226, at 8; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 19; NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22.
272. Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 656–57 (explaining that the fact that Ms. Sarhan’s brother had
not killed others had no impact on whether his persecution of Ms. Sarhan was on account of
her membership in a particular social group); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 34.
273. As explained in the proposed regulations:
In some cases, a persecutor may in fact target an individual victim because of a
shared characteristic, even though the persecutor does not act against others who
possess the same characteristic. For example, in a society in which members of
one race hold members of another race in slavery, that society may expect that
a slaveowner who beats his own slave would not beat the slave of his neighbor. It
would nevertheless be reasonable to conclude that the beating is centrally motivated by the victim’s race. Similarly, in some cases involving domestic violence, an
applicant may be able to establish that the abuser is motivated to harm her because of her gender or because of her status in a domestic relationship. This may
be a characteristic that she shares with other women in her society, some of whom
are also at risk of harm from their partners on account of this shared characteristic. Thus, it may be possible in some cases for a victim of domestic violence to satisfy the “on account of” requirement, even though social limitations and other
factors result in the abuser having the opportunity, and indeed the motivation, to
harm only one of the women who share this characteristic, because only one of
these women is in a domestic relationship with the abuser.
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); see also DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 34; CGRS PRACTICE
ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 19.
274. Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 656–57 (“Imagine the neo-Nazi who burns down the house of
an African-American family. We would never say that this was a personal dispute because the
neo-Nazi did not burn down all of the houses belonging to African-Americans in the
town.”).
275. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. 478, 483 (1992)); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62 (stating that direct and circumstantial
evidence of the persecutor’s motive may establish nexus); NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 12 (citing Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483; Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, 616 F.3d
711, 715 (7th Cir. 2010)) (noting that a requirement to provide evidence that the persecutor is aware of the specific particular social group would be contrary to “well-established case
law finding that nexus can be proven through direct and circumstantial evidence.”); see also
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 18 (“Requiring each modifier [in the group
definition] to be an independent, central reason for the persecution could make it nearly
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The applicant is not required to establish the persecutor’s motivation in relation to each term included in the identified particular
social group or even the persecutor’s exact motivation, as such evi276
dence would be nearly impossible to obtain from a persecutor.
The Attorney General appeared to imply that an applicant must
establish that her membership in the group is the abuser’s central,
or even sole, motivation. The Real ID Act unambiguously provides:
To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the
meaning of such section, the applicant must establish that
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one cen277
tral reason for persecuting the applicant.
Any interpretation to the contrary would conflict with the plain
278
language of the statute. Membership in the particular social
group does not need to be even a “dominant central reason for
279
persecution.” Rather, it must only play “more than a minor role
280
in motivating the persecutor.”
In the context of Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, the motivation of the abuser was the woman’s subordinate status in their relationship and society’s acceptance of that view. This motivation was
established by evidence of the abusers’ statements and actions
seeking to control them, exert his domination over them, and the
belief that he had a right to do so to a woman in a relationship

impossible for petitioners to successfully navigate the legal requirements for asylum and
withholding of removal.”) (citing Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 n.4 (4th Cir. 2015)).
276. NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 12; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 18 (citing Mustafa v. Holder, 707 F.3d 743, 752 (7th Cir. 2013); Ali v. Ashcroft,
394 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2005); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1030 (2d Cir. 1994); Temu v.
Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 892 (4th Cir. 2014); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th
Cir. 2009); Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483; Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 108–
09 (3d Cir. 2010)).
277. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (emphasis added).
278. In Grace v. Whitaker, the court found that the Attorney General in Matter of A-B- had
not established a new standard for the nexus requirement in the context of credible fear
determinations and had articulated the correct “at least one central reason” standard. No.
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *24 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19501 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
279. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39 (quoting Quinteros-Mendoza v.
Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009)).
280. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 688 n.6 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Shaikh v. Holder, 702
F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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with him, and evidence of society’s treatment of violence against
281
women by intimate partners.
D. Persecution
The Attorney General asserted that the BIA defines persecution
using three elements: (1) “‘Persecution’ involves an intent to target
a belief or characteristic;” 282 (2) “[T]he level of harm must be ‘se283
vere;’” (3) “[T]he harm or suffering must be ‘inflicted either by
the government of a country or by persons or an organization that
284
the government was unable or unwilling to control.’”
Regarding the first element, relying on Matter of Kasinga, Sessions explained that “private criminals are motivated more often by
greed or vendettas than by an intent to ‘overcome [the protected]
285
characteristic of the victim.’” Although the BIA in Matter of
Kasinga provided that “persecution can consist of the infliction of
harm or suffering by a government, or persons a government is
unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the
victim,” the BIA did not suggest that “private criminals are motivat286
ed more often by greed or vendettas.” In support of his assertion,
Attorney General Sessions further relied on the BIA’s vacated decision in Matter of R-A-, in which the BIA found that the applicant’s
husband was motivated to abuse her because she was his wife, not
because she was “a member of some broader collection of women.” 287 Here, the Attorney General confused the issue of “persecution” with the issue of “nexus,” or whether the persecution is “on
account of” the particular social group identified. 288 Regardless,
Sessions wholly disregarded the reasons for the husband’s abuse of

281. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39–
40; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 8; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 26–
28, 35–36.
282. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337–38 (A.G. 2018) (citing In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 40, 44 n.2 (B.I.A. 2017)), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018
WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
283. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38 (citing In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 172–73
(B.I.A. 2007)).
284. Id. (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985)).
285. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.
286. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 222–23).
287. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (quoting In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 920 (B.I.A.
2001)).
288. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 921.
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his wife: that she was a woman subject to his subordination. 289 The
husband targeted the wife because she was a woman, and he used
290
the abuse “to affirm his dominance over her.”
As to the second element, the Attorney General recognized that
291
“private violence” may be “severe.” He further recognized that
the applicant in Matter of A-R-C-G- suffered abuse that was “suffi292
ciently severe.” As to the third element, the Attorney General
correctly stated the requirement throughout his decision that if
persons other than the government inflict the harm, the government must be unable or unwilling to control them. However, Sessions appeared to raise the standard of “unable or unwilling” to a
293
much higher, and possibly impossible to meet, standard. He asserted, “[t]he applicant must show that the government condoned
the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete helpless294
ness to protect the victims.”

289. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 939 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting) (citing Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.)) (asserting that the husband acted on account of the applicant’s gender, their relationship, and the fact that he knew “as a woman subject to his subordination, the respondent would receive no protection from the authorities if she resisted his abuse and persecution”); see supra note 268.
290. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 941 (B.I.A. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member,
dissenting) (citing Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.)); see supra note 268.
291. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.
292. Id.
293. In fact, in Grace v. Whitaker, the court found that Matter of A-B- created a new
heightened requirement for establishing “persecution” in the context of non-state actor persecution. Specifically, the Attorney General established a requirement that the government
“condone” the persecution or be completely helpless to protect the victims, as opposed to
the “unable or unwilling” requirement established in Matter of Acosta. Grace v. Whitaker, No.
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *22 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19501 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). The court recognized that under this new construction of
“persecution,” “no asylum applicant who received assistance from the government, regardless of how ineffective that assistance was, could meet the persecution requirement when the
persecutor is a non-government actor.” The court found that the term “persecution” was not
ambiguous, that the new heightened standard established in Matter of A-B- was inconsistent
with immigration laws, and that the Matter of A-B- standard cannot be applied in credible
fear determinations. Id. at *21. Further, the Court rejected the government’s reliance on
U.S. circuit court cases that used the words “condone” or “complete helplessness” because
the courts in those cases did not actually apply such a heightened standard. Id. at *22. Rather, the courts applied the unable and unwilling standard, and the court in Grace v. Whitaker was not required to defer to the government’s interpretation of U.S. circuit court precedent. Id. at *23.
294. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38 (citing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir.
2000); Hor v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Dara Lind, Exclusive: How
Asylum Officers are Being Told to Implement Sessions’s New Rules, VOX (June 19, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/19/17476662/asylum-border-sessions
(reporting on a new USCIS memo directing asylum officers to use a “complete helplessness”
standard).
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1. An Unable or Unwilling Government
To the extent the Attorney General attempted to elevate the requirement that the government was “unable or unwilling” to protect to a requirement that the government “condoned” or was
“completely helpless,” it is inconsistent with Matter of Acosta, the
standard applied in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- upon
which he so emphatically relied. 295 Such a heightened standard is
also inconsistent with the requirement of well-founded fear of persecution. Further, the cases upon which he relies do not actually
296
support the recognition of such a standard.
The BIA in Matter of Acosta found that the interpretation of “persecution” by the BIA and U.S. circuit courts prior to the 1980 Refugee Act should apply to the term in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the
Act. This interpretation includes the requirement that the “harm
or suffering had to be inflicted either by the government of a
country or by persons or an organization that the government was
297
unable or unwilling to control.” The Attorney General cited to
298
no subsequent BIA precedent for such a heightened standard. In
fact, the BIA in both Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- recog299
nized the “unable or unwilling” standard.
Further, a heightened standard would require a different result
300
in cases such as Matter of Kasinga. The evidence presented in that

295. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Whether a government is ‘unable or unwilling to control’ private actors . . . is a factual question that must
be resolved based on the record.”) (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th
Cir. 2005)).
296. See CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 21–22; NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 24.
297. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222–23 (B.I.A. 1985) (citing McMullen v. INS, 658
F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(B.I.A. 1987); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971), In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec.
542, 544–45 (B.I.A. 1980), In re Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975)).
298. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38.
299. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014); see In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 208, 224 n.8 (B.I.A. 2014). U.S. circuit court cases citing Matter of A-B- in regard to the
standard in non-state-actor persecution cases have continued to apply the “unable or unwilling” standard. See Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 164 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding that
evidence of a police investigation did not demonstrate that a government was able to provide protection); Tacam-Garcia v. Whitaker, 744 F. App’x 226, 227 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding
that there were several instances where the authorities and the court helped the applicant
and as such, she failed to demonstrate that the government was unable or unwilling to control the alleged persecution by her husband).
300. Notably, both Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- analyzed Matter of Kasinga in
regard to the requirements of membership in a particular social group to evidence that the
result would not be different. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238, 240, 245–46; In re WG-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217–18.
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case, similar to Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, showed that
FGM was widely practiced by the police, the government of Togo
had a poor human rights record, and most African women could
expect little governmental protection from FGM.301 Such evidence
may not meet a standard that the government “condoned” FGM or
was “completely helpless.”
The BIA and U.S. circuit courts have recognized that even when
an applicant does not report harm to the police, this does not prevent a finding that the government was unable or unwilling to pro302
tect her if she can establish that such reporting would be futile.
Further, other bases for a victim’s failure to report abuse may exist,
such as fear of retribution, shame, or financial, religious, cultural,
303
moral, or legal constraints. An applicant may be putting her life
304
at risk by reporting abuse to the police. If she is already aware
that the police will do nothing to respond to her complaints of
abuse, presumably there would be no incentive to endanger herself
further by making a futile report. Additionally, there may be wellfounded concerns about losing any societal or financial support or
305
even custody of her children.
301. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
302. See Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007); In re S-A-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding that although the applicant did not seek protection
from the government, if she had done so the Moroccan authorities would have been unable
or unwilling to protect her); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES §
4:11 (Thompson Reuters 2018); see also Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950–54
(4th Cir. 2015) (finding that the applicant might be eligible for asylum even though she did
not report the persecution to government authorities); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra
note 190, at 41; Coven Memorandum, supra note 69 (“Breaching social mores . . . may result
in harm, abuse or harsh treatment that is distinguishable from the treatment given the general population, frequently without meaningful recourse to state protection.”).
303. Factors that influence a battered woman’s behavior include:
(1) fear of retaliation; (2) the economic (and other tangible) resources available
to her; (3) her concern for her children; (4) her emotional attachment to her
partner; (5) her personal emotional strengths, such as hope or optimism; (6) her
race, ethnicity, and culture; (7) her emotional, mental, and physical vulnerabilities; and (8) her perception of the availability of social support.
Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1232 (1993).
304. In fact, it is widely recognized in the United States that victims are in the most danger at the moment they make a decision to separate. This issue is termed “separation assault,” which describes an attack that seeks to block a woman from leaving, retaliate for her
leaving, or end the separation by force. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991). The existence of protective
orders and shelters is recognition of the extreme danger of separation assault. Id. at 68.
305. Dutton, supra note 303, at 1233 (discussing why abused women may fear leaving
their partner or taking legal action); see also In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A.
2014) (identifying some of these challenges), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G.
2018); Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of Domestic Violence, 81
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Nevertheless, in both Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, the
applicants reported the abuse to the police who were unable and
unwilling to provide protection. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the applicant
made many attempts to obtain protection from police, but they
306
told her that they would not interfere in a marital relationship.
In Matter of A-B-, the police required the applicant to personally de307
liver a protection order to the abuser. Not only did this put her
life at risk, but it further supported the abuser’s belief that he
could abuse her and nothing would be done about his actions. The
police never enforced the restraining orders. After her abuser attacked her with a knife, the police told her they could not help
308
her.
The Attorney General’s statements that domestic violence is a
difficult crime to prosecute and “complete security” and “perfect
protection” are not required ignore the underlying basis for a gov309
ernment’s failure to provide protection. A government may be
unable or unwilling to enact laws to provide protections to women
who are being abused by their partners or enforce any laws actually
enacted because of the government’s and society’s perception that
women are subordinate to men or women in domestic relationships are considered subordinate to men and undeserving of pro310
tection. If the police and prosecutors will not enforce the protections available to protect against domestic violence, no protections
exist.
Even assuming that the police attempt to provide protection to a
victim, but are unable to do so because of insufficient resources,
this would demonstrate a government’s inability to provide protection. It could also potentially demonstrate an unwillingness to provide protection, to the extent the government refuses to provide
311
sufficient resources. While the “persistence” of domestic violence
FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 857, 878 (2012) (recognizing that barriers to a victim separating from
an abusive partner may include the victim’s fear that the abuser will physically retaliate or a
belief that custody of their children, money, housing, or other factors are at stake).
306. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389.
307. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 41.
308. Id. at 4.
309. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 343–44 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker,
No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
310. See supra notes 133, 291.
311. The law does not require an applicant to demonstrate that a government is both
“unable” and “unwilling” to provide protection—if either is true, an applicant can meet the
requirement of non-state actor persecution. See In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316; CGRS
PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 25 nn.106–07 (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y
Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 289 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (“If anything, the evidence that gang violence is a
serious problem in Honduras provides additional support for Galdamez’s claims [of gov-
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in a country or a government’s “difficulty” policing domestic violence may not necessarily demonstrate a government’s unwilling312
ness to protect, it does support the government’s inability to pro313
vide protection.
By relying on the example of the “persistence” of domestic violence in the United States, the Attorney General further ignored
the United States’ history of treating intimate partner violence as a
private matter outside the scope of government protection. As discussed in more detail below, it is only in the last thirty years that
state and federal laws in the United States have made efforts to
strengthen and ensure the enforcement of intimate partner violence laws. Given U.S. history, it is entirely conceivable that other
countries are unable or unwilling to provide protections to victims
of intimate partner violence.
Requiring a government’s “complete helplessness” to establish
persecution by a non-state actor conflicts with the INA’s “well314
founded fear” provision. An individual would have to demonstrate that her government would be completely helpless to protect
her from persecution by a non-state actor. The U.S. Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that well-founded fear requires a
showing of “clear probability” of the persecution, finding that a
well-founded fear can be based on a less than fifty percent chance
315
of the persecution happening. Moreover, the Supreme Court
recognized that even a ten percent chance of persecution might
316
establish a well-founded fear. A requirement that the governernment inability to protect].”); Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Even
if Afriyie’s ability to file a police report suggests that the police were willing to protect Afriyie, that says little if anything about whether they were able to do so.”); Gathungu v. Holder,
725 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he very fact that the Mungiki have continued to create significant violence over the last decade despite repeated assertions by the Kenyan government that it is cracking down . . . show the Kenyan government is unable to control the
Mungiki.”)).
312. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec at 316, 344.
313. See supra note 311.
314. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22.
315. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); see also CGRS PRACTICE
ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22. Compare 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b), 1208.13(b) (2018), with 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b), 1208.16(b) (2018) (showing that withholding of removal under the
relevant sections requires a higher burden of proof than is required for asylum).
316. That the fear must be “well-founded” does not alter the obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a “more likely than not”
one. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). One can certainly have a wellfounded fear of an event happening when there is less than a fifty percent chance of the
occurrence taking place. As one leading authority has pointed out:
Let us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant’s country of origin every
tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor
camp . . . . In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has man-
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ment is completely helpless or has no chance of being able to provide protection conflicts with the acknowledgement that even less
than a fifty percent chance of persecution happening can establish
a well-founded fear of persecution.
Moreover, to the extent the Attorney General asserted a higher
“complete helplessness” standard, it exceeds even the standard required in cases under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An
applicant applying for protection under CAT must demonstrate
that the state inflicted or would consent to or acquiesce to the applicant’s torture, a standard that is considered higher than that re317
quired for asylum. Acquiescence is defined under the regulations
as requiring that the “public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach
his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activi318
ty.” As such, even under CAT, there is no requirement that a
government “condone” or be “completely helpless.” The government only needs to be “aware that torture of the sort feared by the
319
applicant occurs and remain willfully blind to it.” U.S. circuit
courts, even in cases where the government has made attempts to
provide protection to the victim, have found that the government
320
met CAT’s higher standard of “consent” and “acquiescence.”
2. Relocation
Asylum regulations already provide a distinction between persecution by state actors and non-state actors in the required analysis
321
related to relocation. An applicant who fears persecution by a
state actor is presumed to be unable to relocate despite a lack of

aged to escape from the country in question will have “well-founded fear of being
persecuted’ upon his eventual return.”
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966); see also
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22.
317. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2018); NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 24–25
n.21 (citing In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312–13 (B.I.A. 2000); Rodriguez-Molinero v.
Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 23 n.94.
318. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18, 1208.18 (2018).
319. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2013); see CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 23 n.96.
320. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 23 n.95 (citing Rodriguez-Molinero v.
Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (7th Cir. 2015); De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 109–11
(2d Cir. 2010)).
321. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(3)(ii), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2018); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 27; NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 26.
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past persecution. 322 When the applicant has established past persecution by a non-state actor on account of one of the five grounds
for asylum, including particular social group, she is presumed to
323
have a well-founded fear of persecution on the same basis. DHS
bears the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution because she could avoid persecution and it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to relocate under all the
324
circumstances.
The Attorney General stated, in dicta, that “[w]hen the applicant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few specific
individuals, internal relocation would seem more reasonable than
if the applicant were persecuted, broadly, by her country’s gov325
ernment.” Sessions provided no opinion specifically as to whether it would be reasonable for Ms. A-B- to relocate. Nevertheless, his
speculation on relocation when an applicant has suffered harm
from only a few individuals has no basis in the INA or regulations.
Regardless of the number of individuals perpetrating the harm or
threatening the harm, relocation must allow her to successfully
avoid persecution and be reasonable under the totality of the cir326
cumstances.
Even when only one individual perpetrates the harm, an applicant may not successfully and safely relocate. For instance, in both
Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, the abusers were able to find
327
the applicants when they fled to other areas. Further, asylum
regulations provide a “non-exhaustive list of factors” to consider in
determining whether relocation is reasonable, including “whether
the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender,

322. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(3)(ii), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2018).
323. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), (b)(3)(ii); id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), (b)(3)(ii).
324. Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
325. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 345 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No.
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
326. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2018) (mentioning no criterion for the number of
potential persecutors necessary to seek asylum); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b), 1203.13(b) (2018)
(describing the eligibility requirements for asylum seekers without making any mention of a
minimum number of potential persecutors); see also CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note
187, at 26; NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 26.
327. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 42–43.
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health, and social and familial ties.” 328 An analysis based solely on
the fact that there is only one individual perpetrating the harm
would entirely ignore the reasonableness consideration of the relocation inquiry.
E. Credibility
The Attorney General concluded that the BIA erred in finding
the immigration judge’s credibility determinations in Matter of A-Bto be clearly erroneous because the BIA failed “to give adequate
deference to the credibility determinations and improperly substi329
tuted its own assessment of the evidence.” While a credibility determination allows the adjudicator significant latitude in her analysis of credibility, the REAL ID Act requires the determination to be
made under “the totality of circumstances,” considering the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness”; “the inherent plausibility” of the account; “the consistency” of the applicant’s statements; and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods” in those statements,
regardless of whether the “inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
330
goes to the heart” of the claim. This does not give the adjudicator unrestricted discretion to make an adverse credibility determination.
Any such determination must be made “considering the totality
of the circumstances.” The adjudicator must “present a reasoned
331
analysis of the evidence as a whole.” An adjudicator cannot rely
solely on facts supporting an adverse credibility determination and
ignore the facts that do not support an adverse credibility determi332
nation. A failure to engage in a reasoned analysis of the totality
328. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(B)(3), 1208.13(b)(3) (2018); NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 26.
329. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 341.
330. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) 2018); see also CGRS
PRACTICE ADVISORY supra note 187, at 28 (“[A]djudicators cannot ‘cherry pick solely facts
favoring an adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that undermine that result.’”) (quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010)).
331. Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088,1091 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th
Cir. 2006).
332. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446
F.3d at 700; Shah v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2006); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY
supra note 187, at 28 n.122 (suggesting that adjudicators must allow an applicant to explain
discrepancies, and citing Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2006); Soto-Olarte
v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2009); Pang v. USCIS, 448 F.3d 102, 109–11 (2d
Cir. 2006)); see also Tang v. Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009); Ai Jun Zhi, 751
F.3d at 1091.
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of the evidence would support a clearly erroneous finding on cred333
ibility by the adjudicator. Further, an adjudicator’s failure to allow an applicant to explain any inconsistencies or omissions before
an adverse credibility determination would likewise support a
334
clearly erroneous finding on credibility by the adjudicator. There
are many reasons for inconsistencies or omissions by an applicant
during the process of her case, including fear of the process, linguistic and cultural barriers, trauma, and lack of familiarity with
335
the law on asylum.
Moreover, intimate partner violence-based asylum claims face
significant evidentiary hurdles because of the fact that a private ac336
tor inflicts the persecution within a home. There are rarely police reports because such reports are likely to have been futile and
337
potentially endanger the victim. The victim is likely to be unable
to obtain any letters or assistance in obtaining evidence from family members with the most knowledge about the abuse for fear of
338
retribution from the abusive partner. Hospital records indicating
339
any injuries is rare. Yet, as demonstrated in Matter of A-B-, a victim’s confusion related to the timeline and details of events can
trump the significance of any evidence corroborating her story.340
The failure to resolve the primary interpretative barriers to gender-based asylum claims in any meaningful way—through precedent, legislation, regulation, or otherwise—has allowed the flawed
analysis in Matter of R-A- to reemerge in Matter of A-B-. The Attorney
General’s decision is rooted in Matter of R-A-’s misconception that
intimate partner violence against a female partner is a private matter which occurs because of the relationship between the parties.
As such, it is impossible for a government to provide “complete security” from such a private harm. By returning to this private matter perception, he ignored the true source of intimate partner violence and a government’s inability or unwillingness to provide
protection: societal expectations of gender and subordination. Sessions further ignored the efforts made in U.S. domestic violence
333. See Ai Jun Zhi, 751 F.3d at 1091; Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040.
334. See cases cited supra note 332.
335. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–62; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 28.
336. See Robins, supra note 36, at 457–63 (discussing the barriers to corroboration in private claims); see also Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, EURO. PARL. DOC. (PE
462.481) 60–69 (2012) (acknowledging that gender-related persecution is difficult to prove
and analyzing issues of credibility and evidence in gender-related asylum claims in Europe).
337. See Robins, supra note 36, at 454, 462–63.
338. Id. at 451, 465.
339. Id. at 462–63.
340. See, e.g., Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 288–89 (6th Cir. 2016).
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laws to combat this erroneous perception and ensure that safeguards are provided to prevent this perception from exposing
women who are victims of intimate partner violence to further
harm.
The future of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence
once again looks bleak. The determinations and reasoning of asylum officers, immigration judges, and the BIA in these cases will
341
continue to be unpredictable and disconnected.
III. THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE DIVERGES FROM HOW INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE IS TREATED IN THE UNITED STATES
Historically, many countries, including the United States, accepted the abuse of women by their husbands or intimate partners
342
as a private matter that did not warrant state intervention. While
U.S. state and federal domestic violence laws and judicial training
have made some progress in rectifying this “private matter” percep-

341. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2525; Bookey, supra note 142, at 109–10. In a footnote
to the Matter of A-B- decision, the Attorney General encouraged asylum adjudicators to consider negative discretionary considerations before making an asylum determination, even
when the statutory eligibility for asylum has been established. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316,
345 n.12 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL
6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018). He relied on Matter of Pula to support his list of negative
discretionary considerations. In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987), superseded in part by
regulation on other grounds, 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(e) (1995), as recognized in Andriasian v. INS, 180
F.3d 1033, 1043–44, 1044 n.17 (9th Cir. 1999). However, Matter of Pula specifically provided
additional positive considerations for determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion
is warranted, including “general humanitarian considerations.” Id. at 474. Additionally, the
BIA explained that “the discretionary factors should be carefully evaluated in light of the
unusually harsh consequences which may befall an alien who has established a well-founded
fear of persecution; the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most
egregious of adverse factors.” Id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., PRACTICE
ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 30 n.35 (2019), https://
immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/page/documents/2019-01/
Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201.2019%20Update%20%20Final.pdf. In Grace v. Whitaker, the court determined that Matter of A-B- did not allow for
the exercise of discretion in the context of credible fear determinations. No. 18-cv-0183
(EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *26 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
342. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know
that for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 7, 13 (2004); see also Rabin, supra note 9, at 111–112 (discussing the history of
legal protection for domestic violence victims); Reva B. Siegel, ”The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (discussing the history of legal treatment of domestic abuse in the United States).
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tion, 343 Matter of A-B- demonstrates that this perception remains
alive and well in the context of asylum. The Attorney General’s decision reflects a lack of understanding of the impact that social and
cultural norms of gender inequality have on the treatment of vic344
tims of intimate partner violence in a country. Even if this fact
was arguably acknowledged in the case, it is disregarded in Sessions’s ultimate determination.
Notwithstanding the more recent awareness and drive for legal
345
reform to combat intimate partner violence internationally,
countries’ ability to institute and enforce laws to protect women
from violence by their intimate partners has proven to be a tremendous challenge. In many instances, countries may have laws in
place for prosecution of intimate partner violence crimes, but they
are unable to enforce these laws through police or the judiciary or
lack the political will to do so.
The refusal of the Attorney General and adjudicators in asylum
cases to consider barriers to enforcement of domestic violence laws
and seeking police protection in other countries is in stark contrast
to the attention given to these issues in the context of intimate
partner violence crimes that are committed in the United States.
Since the 1970s, the federal and state legal systems’ response to in346
timate partner violence has changed dramatically. Prior to 1970,
the criminal justice system treated intimate partner violence as a
347
private matter with few options to protect victims.
The Department of Justice’s 1984 Report of the Attorney Gen348
eral’s Task Force on Family Violence was one of the first steps
towards a significant advancement in the response to intimate
partner violence in the criminal justice system in the United
349
States. This report identified the criminal justice system’s issues

343. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999); Jonathan
Lippman, Ensuring Victim Safety and Abuser Accountability: Reforms and Revisions in New York
Courts’ Response to Domestic Violence, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1417 (2012); Rabin, supra note 9;
Siegel, supra note 342. See generally Goodmark, supra note 342(discussing federal, state and
community responses to domestic violence since the 1970s).
344. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; Rabin, supra note 9, at 111–12; Randall, supra
note 40, at 531.
345. See, e.g., Musalo & Knight, supra note 36, at 57–58.
346. See Goodmark, supra note 342; Rabin, supra note 9, at 113–18; Siegel, supra note
342.
347. See Goodmark, supra note 342; Rabin, supra note 9, at 113–18; Siegel, supra note
342.
348. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, CG017891,
FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 10–16 (1984).
349. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 13–14.
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in intimate partner violence cases and provided recommendations
350
for change. Since the 1984 Report, significant progress has been
made in the protection of victims of intimate partner violence
351
which occurs inside the United States. States passed new manda352
tory arrest laws and “no-drop policies.” Through mandatory arrest laws, police are required to make an arrest when there is probable cause to support that an intimate partner violence crime was
353
committed. These laws were intended to ensure that police respond to intimate partner violence crimes and provide protection
354
to the victim, thereby increasing victims’ trust in the police.
These laws have had an important impact on increased arrest rates
355
in intimate partner violence cases.
At the same time, in response to victim reluctance to support
charges against their abuser or to testify against their abuser, prosecutors’ offices began instituting “no-drop” policies that required
prosecutors to move forward with intimate partner violence cases
356
when sufficient evidence existed. The reluctance of victims to
support charges against their abusive partner, or even report
abuse, may stem from fear of retribution by the abuser, the abuser’s continued psychological control over the victim, concerns
about the loss of financial support from the abuser, loss of child
custody, religious and cultural reasons, issues of self-esteem, and
357
lack of education, among many others. States passed civil protection order statutes to protect the victim from the abuser so that the
358
victim is able to leave. In further efforts to alleviate these fears,
states enacted laws on child custody and visitation protections for
victims and created community resources for victims to receive
359
support.
In addition to state protections for victims of intimate partner
violence, in 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women
360
Act (VAWA). VAWA provides funding and support for police departments that institute pro-arrest policies in intimate partner vio-

350. See id.
351. See generally Goodmark, supra note 342 (discussing federal, state and community
responses to domestic violence since the 1970s).
352. See id. at 15–19; Rabin, supra note 9, at 115.
353. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 15–19.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. Dutton, supra note 303, at 1232–33; see also Kuennen, supra note 305, at 857, 878.
358. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 10–11; Rabin, supra note 9, at 115.
359. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 11–13; Rabin, supra note 9, at 114–15.
360. Goodmark, supra note 342, at 8–9; Rabin, supra note 9, at 116.
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lence cases and provide training for police officers, judges, and
prosecutors on violence against women. It also created federal
penalties related to violence against women and required states to
361
enforce protection orders entered in other state courts. As a part
of VAWA, Congress provided undocumented women who have suffered intimate partner violence by U.S. citizens or permanent residents, as well as the undocumented women’s children, with a path
towards permanent residency. It also provided for cancellation of
removal without the assistance or knowledge of the abuser in an
effort to prevent abusers from using the victim’s undocumented
362
status to continue his control over the victim. VAWA also created
the U-visa, which allows non-citizen victims of serious crimes in the
United States who are assisting in the investigation or prosecution
of the crime to obtain non-immigrant status and a path towards
363
permanent residency.
Many states and jurisdictions have instituted training programs
364
for judges who handle intimate partner violence-related matters.
These education and training programs work to eliminate judicial
bias and foster neutrality and understanding in intimate partner
365
violence cases. Training may include sessions on the misconceptions of the dynamics of intimate partner violence and its effect on
victims, psychology of intimate partner violence victims, applicable
366
law and procedure, and cultural and linguistic issues.
In contrast to the numerous protection avenues available to
women, including undocumented women, who suffer intimate
partner violence in the United States, women who flee intimate
partner violence that occurs in a foreign country are limited to the
367
antiquated constraints of asylum law to obtain protection. Despite public awareness in the United States of the problem of intimate partner violence and substantial progress in federal and state
law combating it, asylum law trails behind by almost fifty years. The
male-centric lens through which refugee/asylum law developed
continues to hamper progress in U.S. asylum law relating to intimate partner violence.

361. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 9; Rabin, supra note 9, at 116.
362. Lianna E. Donovan, The Violence Against Women Act’s Protection of Immigrant Victims:
Past, Present, and Proposals for the Future, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 745, 758–62 (2014); Rabin, supra
note 9, at 116–17.
363. Donovan, supra note 361, at 745, 758–62; Rabin, supra note 9, at 116–17.
364. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343, at 1427–31.
365. See Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343, at 1430.
366. See Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343, at 1430.
367. Rabin, supra note 9, at 125.
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Further, U.S. legal responses to intimate partner violence have
acknowledged that victims often may not report abuse, support
criminal charges, or attempt to leave the abuser, and have sought
368
to remedy these issues. In contrast, it is these precise issues that
support the denial of an asylum claim because the victim failed to
report the abuse to the police or demonstrate their inability to
leave the relationship prior to fleeing to the United States. These
issues can only be combated through new legislation or regulations
for asylum adjudications involving intimate partner violence, judicial training and education, and tracking mechanisms for genderrelated asylum cases.
IV. PROVIDING GUIDANCE IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS INVOLVING
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
U.S. asylum law provides no clear guidance on key aspects of the
refugee definition. This is demonstrated by the well-documented
history of U.S. jurisprudence on the particular social group category in regard to gender and intimate partner violence victims. Guidance is lacking, particularly related to the definition of a particular
social group as it pertains to these victims, non-state actor persecution when a state is unable or unwilling to provide protection, and
the nexus between the non-state actor persecution and the particular social group ground. The Attorney General’s decision in Matter
of A-B- provided no clarification or guidance on these issues for adjudicators.
Moreover, although he acknowledged that asylum claims based
on intimate partner violence must be examined on a case-by-case
basis, Sessions made a series of generalized statements about why
these claims are “unlikely” to meet the refugee definition. As a result, his decision will serve to prejudice adjudicators in their analysis of these claims. Adjudicators will continue to be left to their
own discretion, leading to drastically different results in asylum
cases based on intimate partner violence. New legislation or regulations, adjudicator training, and tracking of outcomes of genderbased asylum claims are essential to creating an environment
where more consistent and fair adjudications of women’s asylum

368.

Goodmark, supra note 342, at 10–19; Rabin, supra note 9, at 115.
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claims, including those who have suffered intimate partner vio369
lence, are possible.
A. New Legislation or Regulations
In 2000, before DHS took over asylum adjudications, the INS
published a proposed rule to amend the regulations establishing
asylum and withholding eligibility.370 The proposed rules aimed to
provide “generally applicable principles that will allow for case-bycase adjudication of claims based on domestic violence or other se371
rious harm inflicted by individual non-state actors.” In setting out
these principles, the proposed rule directly addressed the BIA’s
372
Matter of R-A- decision. It removed “certain barriers,” created by
the Matter of R-A- decision, to claims that domestic violence
amounts to persecution based on membership in a particular social group when a government proves to be unwilling or unable to
373
give protection.
The proposed rules highlighted the immutability requirement as
374
a key part of its definition of a particular social group. In order
for a characteristic to be immutable, it must be “unchangeable” or
375
“fundamental to an applicant’s identity.” Gender was considered
376
an immutable characteristic within this definition. While the
proposed rules provided a list of additional factors that “may” be
taken into account in considering whether “a particular social
group exists,” they are not considered “requirements” in the par377
ticular social group determination.
Recognizing that the BIA’s conclusion in Matter of R-A- seemed
to eliminate the possibility that the “on account of” requirement

369. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2515, 2539 (calling for new regulations to provide
guidance in intimate partner violence-based asylum claims and noting that “creative arguments based on existing law will not overcome the innate hostility of some adjudicators to
this type of claim”); see also Bookey, supra note 167, at 11 (asserting that the limitations of
Matter of A-R-C-G- demonstrate the need for “comprehensive, clear, and binding guidance”
either from the Board or in the form of new regulations).
370. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
371. Id. at 76,589.
372. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001).
373. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 76,593.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 76,594–95.
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would be met when the persecutor did not harm other members of
the particular social group, the proposed rules stated that this
should not be “required as a matter of law . . . in order for an ap378
plicant to satisfy the ‘on account of’ requirement.” The proposed
rules explicitly permitted the possibility that victims of domestic violence may fulfill the “on account of” requirement despite the fact
that the persecutor had the opportunity and motivation to abuse
“only one of the women who share this characteristic, because only
one of these women is in a domestic relationship with the abus379
er.”
Although these rules represented considerable progress at the
time in describing the relationship between gender and the particular social group ground, they were never finalized. Since that
time, the issues presented in Matter of R-A- remain and progression
away from these proposed rules have become even more evident in
Matter of A-B-. The Attorney General’s analysis in Matter of A-B- has
only further highlighted the need for legislation and regulations to
combat the continuing challenges to asylum claims based on gender involving intimate partner violence. In conjunction with similar legislative changes, these proposed rules should be amended
and finalized by DHS to provide guidance to adjudicators and con380
sistency in the asylum process. While these rules may not eliminate all inconsistency in asylum claims based on intimate partner
violence, they can resolve key issues in this type of case.
Scholars have also debated an amendment to the refugee definition under the INA, but concluded that, while an amendment may
provide more certainty, new or amended regulations could be
381
passed more quickly and easily than an amendment to the Act.
Given the positions of the current administration, it is unlikely that
new or amended regulations favorable to asylum claims from
women fleeing intimate partner violence will be passed in the near
378. Id. at 76,592.
379. Id. at 76,593.
380. Such regulations promulgated by DHS at 8 C.F.R. § 208 should also be duplicated
and adopted by the DOJ at 8 C.F.R. § 1208. As a result, asylum officers within USCIS under
DHS and immigration judges and the BIA under the DOJ would be bound by the regulations. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2549–50; Robins, supra note 36, at 442–43.
381. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2539–44 (arguing there is precedent for legislative action to amend the INA, but such action is unlikely and difficult, while regulatory reform
would be easier and more effective in resolving the difficulties faced by asylum claims based
on intimate partner violence); see also Natalie Rodriguez, Note, Give Us Your Weary but Not
Your Battered: The Department of Homeland Security, Politics and Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence, 18 SW. J. INT’L. L. 317, 334 (2011) (arguing that legislative action to amend the INA is
the best solution to the issues presented in asylum claims based on intimate partner violence
but, until an amendment can be achieved, regulations should be promulgated).
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future. An amendment to the refugee definition under the INA
may be more probable, although still unlikely, and would provide
the added benefit of certainty. Further, there is precedent for an
amendment to the INA to provide protections to certain types of
asylum claims. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act to provide protections for
persons fleeing coercive family planning measures in China. This
Act amended the definition of “refugee” in the INA to recognize
that:
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall
be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political
opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he
or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution
382
on account of political opinion.
Similar to new regulations, amendments to the INA could also
provide definitions and guidance particular to gender-based asylum claims, including those involving intimate partner violence.
These amendments may be related to the particular social group
ground, the nexus between the persecution and the particular social group, persecution by non-state actors when the government is
unable or unwilling to provide protection, and the proper analysis
of the viability of relocation, as well as credibility determinations.
As such, the following recommendations refer both to new legislation and regulations.
1. Incorporate Gender as a
Particular Social Group into the Refugee Definition
A new piece of legislation and/or updated regulations should
define “particular social group” and specifically list gender as an
identified “particular social group.” The definition of a particular

382.

INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
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social group in the proposed regulations from 2000 is taken from
383
Matter of Acosta. The proposed rules stated,
“A particular social group is composed of members who
share a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex,
color, kinship ties, or past experience, that a member either cannot change or that is so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that he or she should not
384
be required to change it.”
Not only did these rules recognize sex as an immutable characteristic, but they also acknowledged that circumstances may exist under
which marital status or any intimate relationship could be considered an immutable trait when there is evidence that the victim
385
could not reasonably be expected to leave the relationship.
When the rules were proposed, the BIA had not yet fully articulated its additional requirements of particularity and social distinction to demonstrate a particular social group. Since 2000, the BIA
has solidified these two additional requirements in Matter of
M-E-V-G-, Matter of W-G-R-, and subsequent cases, including Matter of
386
A-B-. The requirements of particularity and social distinction are
confusing, repetitive, and superfluous. When set forth as absolute
requirements for demonstrating a particular social group, they
have served and will continue to serve as an impediment to the
recognition of gender-based asylum claims, in particular those involving intimate partner violence. This is clearly demonstrated in
387
the Attorney General’s flawed analysis in Matter of A-B-.
New legislation and regulations should return to the Matter of
Acosta definition of particular social group, as this definition closely
follows that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) guidelines, which has rejected any additional requirement of social distinction or perception to demonstrate a particular social group. Rather, similar to the UNHCR’s guidelines,
the definition should include social perception as an alternative element in establishing the existence of a particular social group.

383. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
387. See Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2016).
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The UNHCR’s Social Group Guidelines incorporate the two dom388
inant approaches to determining what constitutes a social group.
The first approach, called the “protected characteristics” approach,
as in Matter of Acosta, involves examining whether a group is comprised of persons sharing an immutable characteristic, or one that
is so fundamental to individual identity a person “should not be
389
compelled to forsake it.”
The second approach, called the “social protection” approach,
which has similarities to the BIA’s social distinction and particularity requirements, looks at “whether or not a group shares a common characteristic which makes them a cognizable group or sets
390
them apart from society at large.” The UNHCR recognized that
sometimes the application of these two approaches to a similar
case may bring about different results, and the guidelines provided
391
a definition that incorporates both approaches :
A particular social group is a group of persons who share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The
characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, con392
science or the exercise of one’s human rights.
Accordingly, new proposed legislation and regulations could define a particular social group as:
composed of members who share a common, immutable
characteristic, such as sex, gender, color, kinship ties, or
past experience, or who are perceived as a group by society.
The characteristic is one which the member either cannot
change or that is so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that he or she should not be required to change it.

388. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ¶¶ 5–10, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Social Group Guidelines].
389. Id. ¶ 6.
390. Id. ¶ 7.
391. Id. ¶ 10.
392. See id. ¶¶ 9–10
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Similar to the UNHCR definition in its Social Group Guidelines,
this definition includes both those “who share a common characteristic” and those “who are perceived as a group by society,” but
393
does not require both approaches to be met. Moreover, this def394
inition includes recognition of gender as an immutable trait.
This will eliminate any further confusion for adjudicators about
whether gender alone constitutes a particular social group.
The recognition of gender alone as a particular social group will
remove the extensive and confusing analysis required in defining
gender-based social groups as persons who are married or in do395
mestic relationships and are unable to leave the relationship. It
will eliminate the need for an overly narrow identification of a
gender-related particular social group, which limits a case’s ap396
plicability as a source of precedent in future cases. The immutable characteristic of the social group in an asylum claim based on
intimate partner violence is gender. Whether or not an asylum
seeker has the ability to leave the relationship is best examined in
the context of whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of
persecution and in considerations of the viability of relocation, as
397
discussed below.
a. Other Strategies for the Incorporation of Gender into the
Refugee Definition
The identification of gender as a particular social group through
new legislation or regulations would be the most effective way to
eliminate the inconsistencies and ambiguity in asylum claims based
on intimate partner violence. However, adjudicators and scholars

393. Id. ¶ 10.
394. Although distinctions have been made between the meanings of the words “sex”
and “gender,” that discussion is outside the scope of this Article. For instance, sex is a biological determination and “[g]ender refers to the relationship between women and men
based on socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities that are assigned to one sex or another. . . .” UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note
10, ¶ 3. In recognition of this distinction and the potential confusion that could result, this
Article recommends the inclusion of both “sex” and “gender” in the definition.
395. Other scholars support the recognition of sex or gender as a particular social
group. See, e.g., Deborah E. Anker et al., Defining “Particular Social Group” in Terms of Gender:
The Shah Decision and U.S. Law, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005, 1006 (1999); Corrales, supra
note 168, at 90; Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS.
Q. 213, 261–62 (1995); Marsden, supra note 3, at 2544; Reimann, supra note 69, at 1254–55;
Sidun, supra note 178, at 141.
396. Bookey, supra note 167, at 13–15.
397. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996).

WINTER 2019]

Critiquing Matter of A-B-

417

have used or proposed a number of other approaches for analyzing asylum claims based on intimate partner violence.
First, scholars have proposed that gender should be a sixth
ground for asylum in addition to race, religion, nationality, politi398
cal opinion, and particular social group. As a separate ground,
gender can be interpreted outside the construct of the particular
399
social group category. Similar to identifying gender as a particular social group, gender as a sixth ground for asylum would eliminate the need to narrow particular social groups of women identi400
However, creating an
fied in gender-related asylum cases.
entirely new category such as gender will require developing a
whole new framework for interpretation and analysis.
In contrast, the “particular social group” category has an existing
401
history of interpretation and analysis that can be used. As proposed above, new legislation and regulations may incorporate aspects of that history including Matter of Acosta’s common immutable characteristic requirement and a societal perception
requirement that has a relationship to the BIA’s Matter of M-E-V-Gsocial visibility and particularity tests. The societal perception requirement could follow the UNHCR’s approach, rather than the
BIA’s confusing social visibility and particularity tests, and could be
used in the alternative to the common immutable characteristic
402
requirement—not as an additional requirement. Moreover, the
addition of gender as a sixth ground for asylum would set apart the
refugee definition in U.S. asylum law from other countries in a very
403
important way. Internationally, the push has been centered on

398. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Hueben, Domestic Violence and Asylum Law: The United States
Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution, 70 UMKC L. REV. 453, 466
(2001) (arguing that by adding gender as a ground for asylum, women would only have to
prove persecution on account of gender); Randall, supra note 40, at 566 (arguing that gender must be “legally recognized as its own ground of persecution”); Mattie L. Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category,
3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179 (1993) (arguing that only a sixth refugee category, gender,
can ensure that the refugee definition will address the harms particular to women).
399. Barreno, supra note 47, at 254–55; Hueben, supra note 397.
400. See Hueben, supra note 397.
401. See Andrea Binder, Gender and the “Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of
the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 193 (2001) (asserting that while a
“reformulation of the refugee definition would be desirable,” a focus on “improving the
administrative and judicial practices with regard to the existing conventional and statutory
framework” may be more promising).
402. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 261–62 (acknowledging that if the UNHCR definition
is adopted in the U.S., adjudicators would have to choose whether to apply UNHCR’s social
perception approach).
403. See Macklin, supra note 394, at 262.
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gender as a particular social group and guidelines have been de404
veloped around this strategy.
Second, some scholars have advocated for consideration of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence in the context of
405
other grounds for asylum, such as political opinion. The belief
that women are entitled to be treated as human beings is a political
406
opinion, and leaving an intimate partner relationship where the
woman is abused and the state sponsors or is complicit in the sub407
jugation of women is an expression of that political opinion.
However, in the context of intimate partner violence, the victim is
not being persecuted because of her “belief,” but because she is a
408
woman and the abuser believes that she is subordinate.
This approach could be an effective basis for an asylum claim
when a woman resisted the abuse in some way prior to fleeing to
the United States, such as leaving the relationship, and the state
has supported or been complicit in the subjugation of women. Yet,
when the applicant has not attempted to leave the relationship
prior to fleeing to the United States, this strategy fails to establish
that the abuser persecuted the victim on account of her belief that
women are entitled to be treated as human beings and, therefore,
to be free from abuse. Further, this approach would not help asylum claims based on intimate partner violence move away from an
overemphasis on the victim’s attempts to leave the relationship.
Third, some adjudicators who are reluctant to accept gender
alone as forming the particular social group rely on the “gender
plus” strategy, which creates particular social groups based on gender plus other immutable characteristics. In Matter of A-B-, the Attorney General focused on the proposed social groups defined by

404. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; UNHCR Social Group Guidelines,
supra note 387.
405. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
117, 156–59 (2012) (arguing that intimate partner violence may be inflicted on account of a
woman’s political opinion); Alice Edwards, Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law and Policy 1950–2010, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 21, 28 (2010) (asserting
that reliance only on the particular social group ground for women’s asylum claims ignores
women’s role as political actors); see also Randall, supra note 50, at 298–99 (discussing the
argument for consideration of gender persecution in the context of political opinion).
406. Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 155; see also Randall, supra note 50, at 298–99.
407. Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 158.
408. See Macklin, supra note 178, at 58–59 (“[D]omestic violence is not about what a
woman believes, but about her gender identity—and the sexist beliefs of the man who abuses her.”); Sidun, supra note 178, at 138–39 (“The majority of women abroad are not raped
or beaten because of a political opinion that they hold. Women are raped and beaten because they are women.”).
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the gender-plus approach and ignored the social group proposed
by Matter of A-B-, which defined particular social group by gender
alone. The gender-plus approach was also used frequently in cases
prior to Matter of A-B- including in Matter of A-R-C-G-. Adjudicators’
analyses of social groups based on gender plus, as exhibited in Matter of A-B-, are often confusing and lead to piecemeal and inconsistent results in these cases. Even when such an asylum claim is
approved, the determination based on a narrowly defined particu409
lar social group may have little precedential value. Undoubtedly,
the failure to recognize that gender alone is the basis for the persecution and forms the particular social group deprives victims of
410
intimate partner violence of protection.
The idea that gender may form a particular social group is not a
new concept. Adjudicators in the United States, the UNHCR, and
411
other countries have acknowledged this. Nevertheless, many adjudicators continue to resist granting asylum based on gender
alone for fear of opening the floodgates to women asylum seek412
ers.
b. Opening the Floodgates
The primary argument against creating gender as a particular
social group is that it would create a “flood” of women asylum
413
seekers. Such arguments fail to recognize that race, religion, nationality, and political opinion all have the potential to incorporate

409. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 261–63; see also Bookey, supra note 167.
410. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 261–63.
411. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19
I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; UNHCR Social
Group Guidelines, supra note 387; Reimann, supra note 69, at 1240 (noting that Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and some other European nations have recognized
gender as a particular social group); Rodriguez, supra note 380, at 340–43 (finding that
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have recognized gender-based
asylum and have not had a flood of such applications).
412. See Marsden, supra note 10, at 2526–27 (asserting that while U.S. courts have
acknowledged in dicta that gender may be a basis for an asylum claim, “in practice, courts
have been reluctant to grant asylum on the basis of a particular social group defined solely
or primarily by gender”); Randall, supra note 40, at 563 (recognizing that some U.S. adjudicators in asylum cases have expressed concern that “gender is an over-broad category on
which to define a social group”).
413. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 7 (“The size of the group has sometimes been used as a basis for refusing to recognize ‘women’ generally as a particular social
group. This argument has no basis in fact or reason, as the other grounds are not bound by
this question of size.”).
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large numbers of people. 414 The refugee definition incorporates
many other elements that must be met in order to qualify for asylum in addition to demonstrating that an asylum seeker falls under
one of the five grounds for asylum. These elements include a wellfounded fear of persecution and proof that the state is unable or
unwilling to provide protection when a non-state actor inflicts per415
secution. For example, while intimate partner abuse happens
throughout the world, many countries are able and willing to pro416
vide protection to victims. In such circumstances, an asylum
claim based on intimate partner violence would fail to meet the
refugee definition. The asylum process in the United States is
complex and difficult to complete successfully without (and even
with) representation, and many cases are withdrawn or abandoned
417
in the process. The recognition of gender as a particular social
group would not lead to the grant of asylum in every gender-based
418
asylum claim.
Further, countries that recognize gender as a basis for persecu419
tion have not experienced a flood of women asylum seekers. In
fact, as reported by a number of scholars and acknowledged by the
Department of Homeland Security, Canada recognizes that gender
may form a particular social group in intimate partner violencebased asylum cases, but has not experienced an increase in gender420
based claims. Many women who have an asylum claim based on
intimate partner violence may not want to risk leaving their abusive
relationship due to fear of the abuser or family or cultural imped421
iments. Not all of these women have the resources to flee to the
422
United States and make an application for asylum.
Moreover, the size of an applicant’s social group is not a valid
423
basis for rejecting their asylum claim based on gender. The U.S.

414. Id.; see also UNHCR Social Group Guidelines, supra note 387, at 5 (explaining that
the size of a social group is not relevant to whether it can be recognized for asylum purposes); Randall, supra note 50, at 299; Anker et al., supra note 394, at 1010.
415. Randall, supra note 40, at 564; Megan Galicia, Comment, Fits and Starts: Towards
Recognizing Gender as a Basis for Asylum in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 85 UMKC L. REV.
1013, 1031 (2017).
416. See Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 160.
417. Corrales, supra note 168, at 88–89.
418. Galicia, supra note 414.
419. Rodriguez, supra note 380, at 340–42.
420. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 46, at 132; Corrales, supra note 168, at 88–89;
Barreno, supra note 47, at 263; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10.
421. See Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 160–61.
422. See id. at 161.
423. Anker et al., supra note 394, at 1010 (“Fear of opening the ‘floodgates,’ however, is
not an appropriate or necessary reason for subverting this branch of asylum law.”); Randall,
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asylum law’s reluctance to acknowledge gender as a particular social group has forced female asylum seekers to create particular social groups that incorporate gender plus other characteristics, including marital status and inability to leave, among many others.
These have become unnecessarily narrow and complicated. The
424
true immutable characteristic is gender.

supra note 50, at 299 (arguing that concern about “floodgates” ignores “the essential nature
of the refugee remedy” as a “case-by-case individual one”). As explained in detail by the Seventh Circuit in Cece v. Holder:
In any event, the breadth of category has never been a per se bar to protected status. As was noted in Iao v. Gonzales,
The number of followers of Falun Gong in China is estimated to be in
the tens of millions, all of them subject to persecution . . . . [Because]
[a]nyone, we suppose, can get hold of a book of [Falun Gong] teachings, start doing the exercises, and truthfully declare himself or herself a
bona fide adherent to Falun Gong[,] [t]he implications for potential
Chinese immigration to the United States may be significant . . . . But
Congress has not authorized the immigration services to [control Chinese immigration] by denying asylum applications in unreasoned decisions.
Many of the groups recognized by the Board and courts are indeed quite broad.
These include: women in tribes that practice female genital mutilation; persons
who are opposed to involuntary sterilization; members of the Darood clan and
Marehan subclan in Somalia (1% of the population of Somalia are members of
the Marehan subclan); homosexuals in Cuba; Filipinos of Chinese ancestry living
in the Philippines (approximately 1.5% of the Philippines population has an identifiable Chinese background). The ethnic Tutsis of Rawanda numbered close to
700,000 before the genocide of 1994, and yet a Tutsi singled out for murder who
managed to escape to the United States could surely qualify for asylum in this
country. And undoubtedly any of the six million Jews ultimately killed in concentration camps in Nazi-controlled Europe could have made valid claims for asylum,
if only they had had that opportunity. Many of our asylum laws originated out of a
need to address just such refugees from World War II. It would be antithetical to
asylum law to deny refuge to a group of persecuted individuals who have valid
claims merely because too many have valid claims. For this reason, we also reject
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that the group of young-looking, attractive Albanian
women who are forced into prostitution is not a cognizable social group because it
is too broad and sweeping of a classification.
The safeguard against potentially innumerable asylum claims is found in the
stringent statutory requirements for all asylum seekers which require that the applicant prove (1) that she has suffered or has a well-founded fear of suffering
harm that rises to the level of persecution, (2) on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and (3) is
unable or unwilling to return to her country because of the persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution.
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
424. Robins, supra note 36, at 446–47.
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2. Persecution by Non-State Actor—
Unwilling or Unable to Protect
Non-state actors are the primary perpetrators of persecution in
gender-based asylum claims, particularly those involving intimate
425
partner violence. The historic cultural acceptance and legal
treatment of intimate partner violence as a private family matter
has continually been an impediment to the success of asylum cases
426
based on intimate partner violence. This is no more evident than
in the Attorney General’s determination in Matter of A-B-. While
police reporting may be relevant and supportive of a state’s inability or unwillingness to protect women from domestic abuse, this evidence may be difficult to obtain. A failure to report the crime may
be due to the victim’s fear of retaliation from the abuser, the victim’s shame, or the victim’s view that the state will not provide any
427
protection and reporting abuse would be useless. These are consequences of cultural and legal acceptance of intimate partner violence as a private matter.
The proposed regulations from 2000 adopted a two-element approach to analyze whether a state is unwilling or unable to pro428
tect : First, did the state take reasonable steps to control the inflic429
Second, did the victim have
tion of harm or suffering?
430
reasonable access to state protection that exists? As argued by
Elsa Bullard, this proposed rule fails to explain whether both elements or only one element must be met to establish a state’s un431
willingness or inability to protect the victim. Moreover, the first
432
element should not be a determining factor in the analysis. A
state may have taken reasonable steps to control the infliction of
harm, but that does not mean that the steps have been effective.
Rather, as proposed by Ms. Bullard, the inquiry in new legislation

425. Id.; Musalo supra note 44, at 49.
426. Id.; Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; see also Markey, supra note 265, at 1322 (stating that in asylum law and international human rights law, “gender has been historically depoliticized—cast as private, personal, and cultural”); Musalo, A Short History, supra note 44.
427. See Dutton, supra note 303, at 1232 (describing the factors that influence women’s
responses to domestic violence); see also, e.g., In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A.
2014) (describing Guatemalan police’s refusal to interfere in a marital relationship), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Kuennen, supra note 305, at 857, 878.
428. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Elsa M. Bullard, Note, Insufficient Government Protection: The Inescapable Element in
Domestic Violence Asylum Cases, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1888 (2011).
432. Id. at 1892–93.
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and regulations should focus solely on the second element of
433
whether the victim has reasonable access to state protection.
The proposed regulations included a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be helpful in determining this issue. These included:
government complicity, attempts by the applicant to obtain protection from the government and the government’s response, official
action that is perfunctory, pattern of government unresponsiveness, general country conditions and denial of services, the nature
of the government’s policies with respect to the harm, and steps
434
taken by the government to prevent the harm. Likewise, the BIA
in Matter of A-R-C-G- provided an instructive list of evidence pertinent to a state’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection,
albeit confusingly addressed in regard to part of its “social distinction” requirement. The list of potential evidence included: country
reports, law enforcement statistics, expert witnesses, an applicant’s
435
past experiences, and other credible sources of information.
Even country reports and law enforcement statistics may not
provide an accurate picture of the protection available for intimate
436
partner violence victims in a country. This may be due to victims’
under-reporting or a failure to adequately track crimes affecting
437
women. As such, expert reports addressing the treatment of
women in the country and the protections afforded to women who
suffer violence, if any exist, may present one of the most critical
sources of evidence to document the inability or unwillingness of a
state to protect victims of intimate partner violence.
Similar to the list of factors in the proposed regulations from
2000 and the BIA’s examples of evidence related to its “social distinction” requirement in Matter of A-R-C-G-, new legislation and
regulations should include a similar non-exhaustive list of factors
and evidence that could be used to establish that the state is unable
or unwilling to protect domestic abuse victims. These factors could
include whether there are criminal and civil laws designed to protect domestic abuse victims and, if so, whether those laws are enforced; cultural and societal perceptions on intimate partner vio-

433. Id.
434. Id.; Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
435. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
436. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 69; Bullard, supra
note 431, at 1896.
437. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 69; Bullard, supra
note 431, at 1896.
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lence; other state actions or inaction on issues of intimate partner
violence; country conditions; the relationship of the abuser to the
state; and if the victim reported the abuse, any state responsiveness
or lack of responsiveness. Further, credible sources of this information may include, but are not limited to, an applicant’s past experiences, expert witnesses, country reports, and law enforcement
statistics.
New legislation and regulations should explain that due to underreporting of intimate partner violence occurrences or a focus
on male-perpetuated crime, country reports and law enforcement
statistics might not always provide an accurate depiction of a state’s
ability and willingness to protect victims of intimate partner violence. New law should further stress that a state’s “aspirations”
should not be considered dispositive of its actual ability or willingness to protect. This is critical when using country reports as evidence on this issue as country reports can sometimes focus on the
state’s aspirations. However, this does not mean that the state actually provides meaningful protection or would even be able to provide meaningful protection in the future.
Finally, new legislation and regulations should state outright
that an asylum seeker’s failure to report intimate partner violence
is not “fatal” to her claim. As demonstrated in many federal circuit
court cases, whether the asylum seekers reported the abuse to the
police was essential to the courts’ determinations that the asylum
seekers failed to demonstrate that the state was unable or unwilling
to protect them. In complete disregard of the issues of retaliation,
shame, cultural norms, and the futility of reporting intimate partner violence to police in many of these circumstances, courts
found that the asylum seekers did not give the state an “opportunity” to protect them. Any new law should explain that a failure to
report abuse to the police is not a reason to deny an asylum claim.
If there is evidence of police protection available to women and
the asylum seeker did not seek such protection, the adjudicator
may ask for reasons why she did not seek police protection, but the
asylum seeker’s failure to report to police alone cannot be the basis
438
for the denial.

438. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 74 (citing a similar
practice in Italy that is identified in this report as “good practice”).
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3. Nexus—The “On Account Of” Requirement
In Matter of A-B-, nexus once again emerged as a barrier to the
approval of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence. 439
Nexus will continue to be problematic in asylum claims involving
intimate partner violence. This is because the private motivations
of the abuser to harm the victim are difficult to demonstrate, in
particular, when the abuser targets the victim based on gender and
440
subordination, but does not seek to persecute other women. In
order to resolve this issue, new legislation and regulations should
441
adopt the bifurcated approach of UNHCR. The language provided in the UNHCR Gender Guidelines is a promising example of
how the bifurcated approach could be added to legislation and
regulations. The guidelines provide:
In cases where there is a risk of being persecuted at the
hands of a non-State actor (e.g. husband, partner or other
non-State actor) for reasons which are related to one of the
Convention grounds, the causal link is established, whether
or not the absence of State protection is Convention related. Alternatively, where the risk of being persecuted at the
hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a Convention
ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to offer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground, the
442
causal link is also established.
UNHCR’s approach forms the causal link between persecution and
a Convention ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
443
and particular social group).
This bifurcated approach in not new to U.S. asylum adjudica444
tions. In fact, the BIA used it in 1996 in Matter of Kasinga, but it
has not been applied consistently, largely due to its narrow identification of the particular social group. 445 In that case, the BIA approved a woman’s asylum application based on her well-founded
439. See Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2016).
440. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524 (“Women should not lose asylum’s protections
merely because they are persecuted in isolation rather than in a group.”).
441. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 6.
442. Id.
443. Musalo, supra note 3, at 787–90 (analyzing the bifurcated approach).
444. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
445. Musalo, A Short History, supra note 45, at 56; Shanyn Gillespie, Note, Terror in the
Home: The Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Battered Women and a Proposal to Right the Wrong
of In re R-A-, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131, 139–147 (2003).
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fear of persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group comprised of “young women of the TchambaKunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe,
and who oppose the practice.” The BIA’s decision recognized that
the nexus between persecution and particular social group could
be established in regard to non-state actors and the state or socie446
ty.
Yet, the BIA’s conclusion just three years later, in Matter of R-A-,
appeared to eliminate the possibility that the “on account of” requirement would be met when the persecutor did not harm other
447
members of the particular social group. In direct response, the
INS’s proposed regulations in 2000 specifically permitted the possibility that victims of domestic violence may fulfill the “on account
of” requirement despite the fact that the persecutor had the opportunity and motivation to abuse “only one of the women who
share this characteristic, because only one of these women [wa]s in
448
a domestic relationship with the abuser.” However, the proposed
regulations did not incorporate the bifurcated approach of Kasinga
and, therefore, would not have resolved the recurring issue of the
persecutor’s motivations.
Since the problem for women who are persecuted is finding a
nexus between the persecution and the particular social group
ground, the bifurcated analysis has allowed the United Kingdom
449
and other countries to give protection to women despite the
nexus problem. The approach allows decision makers to consider
not only the motives of the persecutor, but also to take into ac450
count the State’s or society’s involvement in the persecution.
This bifurcated analysis establishes the “causal connection” between the persecution and the particular social group based on the
451
“non-State perpetrator or the State/society.”
The bifurcated approach may be the least controversial solution
to resolve the nexus issue in gender-based asylum claims as well as
asylum claims based on other grounds, given that it has already
been recognized in Kasinga and adopted by UNHCR guidelines

446. Musalo, supra note 3, at 799.
447. Musalo, A Short History, supra note 45, at 56.
448. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
449. See Musalo, supra note 3, at 787–97 (discussing the bifurcated approach adopted in
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia).
450. Id. at 777–79.
451. Id. at 785–87.
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and other countries. However, this solution has limitations. 452 For
instance, adjudicators would still have significant discretion in determining whether the persecution occurred on account of gender
or if the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection based on
gender. Adjudicators would still need to consider whether gender
was one central reason for the persecution.
Further, the issue of whether the state is unable or unwilling to
protect the asylum applicant could be addressed twice in intimate
partner violence cases, both in the context of non-state actor persecution and then again in the context of nexus. In the nexus context, if the applicant cannot establish intimate partner violence on
account of her gender, not only would she need to demonstrate
that the state is unable or unwilling to protect her, but also that the
lack of protection occurs on account of gender. Simply demonstrating that a state is unable or unwilling to provide protection
alone can be difficult. This may open asylum claims based on intimate partner violence to a whole new set of confusing and incongruous determinations.
Jessica Marsden suggests that the “historical and sociological evidence tying domestic violence to gender warrants drawing the
connection” between intimate partner violence and gender as a
453
matter of law. In order to resolve the issue of nexus between intimate partner violence and gender, she strongly advocates for new
regulations to specifically state, “where a woman has experienced
intimate-partner violence that otherwise meets the standard for
persecution, the victim’s gender shall be deemed to be one central
454
reason for the persecution.” As Ms. Marsden explains, there is
precedent for acknowledging that certain elements of the refugee
definition are met as a matter of law, particularly in regard to the
one-child policy amendment to the Immigration and Nationality
455
Act of 1996. As a result of that legislative amendment, the definition of a refugee now recognizes that a person who has been persecuted or fears persecution related to a coercive population control program has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
456
political opinion.

452. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2541 (“Requiring adjudicators to assess the motives
behind the government’s failure to act will not resolve the inconsistencies that we now see in
the outcomes of domestic violence asylum claims, which stem from a more fundamental
disbelief by some adjudicators that asylum covers domestic violence claims at all.”).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 2544.
455. See id. at 2542–43.
456. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
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While Ms. Marsden’s intelligent and thoughtful proposal addresses the limitations of the nexus issue in intimate partner violence-based asylum claims by going beyond the bifurcated approach, it does not address many other types of gender-based
persecution. The one child policy amendment was an optimistic
sign in that it provided a clear path towards asylum for those individuals. However, the practice of piecemeal incorporation of very
specific types of asylum claims to acknowledge that these claims
meet certain elements of the refugee definition may not foster a
positive, consistent progression in the interpretation of the refugee
definition as it applies to gender-based claims.
One solution may be for new legislation and regulations to provide a non-exhaustive list of the types of persecution that may be
inflicted on account of a woman’s gender and from which a state
may be unable or unwilling to provide protection on account of a
woman’s gender. These illustrations could include: intimate partner violence, sexual violence, family/domestic violence, coerced
family planning, female genital mutilation, honor crimes, and violence or punishment for transgression of social mores, sexual ori457
entation, or gender identity. By providing such a non-exhaustive
list in combination with recognizing gender as forming a particular
social group, the nexus or causal link between the persecution or a
state’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection and a woman’s gender may be more comprehensively recognized in asylum
law.
4. Relocation
If an asylum seeker demonstrates past persecution, she is entitled to the presumption that she also has a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to her country of nationality or habitual
458
residence. The burden then shifts to DHS to overcome the presumption by proving either a “fundamental change of circumstances,” eliminating the asylum seeker’s well-founded fear, or that
it is reasonable for the person to escape persecution by relocating
459
in her country of nationality or habitual residence.
457. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 2 (“Gender-related claims have
typically encompassed, although are by no means limited to, acts of sexual violence, family/
domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation, punishment for
transgression of social mores, and discrimination against homosexuals.”).
458. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1) (2018).
459. Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1).
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Matter of A-B- provided further confusion about what is required
to determine whether asylum seekers can relocate within their
country. 460 Attorney General Sessions failed to allow for any substantive evaluation of the safety and reasonableness of relocation
considering the individual’s family situation, social vulnerabilities,
education or work background and opportunities, or the psychological effects of past persecution. New legislation and regulations
should require that, in order for the presumption to be overcome,
DHS must demonstrate no risk of persecution or harm in the area
of relocation, the availability of state protection, the existence of
family relationships in that area, the availability of basic subsistence
and accommodation, and that health, social, religious, and cultural
461
circumstances would not impede the viability of relocation.
5. Credibility and Corroboration
As Matter of A-B- demonstrates, credibility determinations and
the requirement of corroboration in asylum cases based on intimate partner violence cases continue to be problematic. 462 The
463
REAL ID Act passed by Congress in 2005 provides that an asylum
seeker’s testimony, which is credible, may be sufficient to establish
464
the asylum seeker’s burden without corroborating evidence. In
order to rely on the applicant’s testimony alone, the testimony
must be credible and persuasive, and refer to specific facts “suffi465
cient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.” While the
REAL ID Act on its face may appear to be liberal, in practice it is

460. See, e.g., Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that
Ms. Fuentes-Erazo could safely relocate within Honduras because she had successfully avoided her abuser for five years and he had no interest in locating her, disregarding her testimony regarding financial hardship); Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 290–91 (6th Cir. 2016)
(finding that Ms. Marikasi failed to “substantiate any religious, cultural, or legal constraints
that prevented her from” leaving the relationship or relocating to another part of Zimbabwe); Jeronimo v. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x at 800 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that Ms. Jeronimo failed to show she could not relocate to another area of Guatemala).
461. See Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 73; Lauren N.
Kostes, Domestic Violence and American Asylum Law: The Complicated and Convoluted Road Post
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 211, 236–37 (2015) (explaining the current standard).
462. See, e.g., Marikasi, 840 F.3d at 286 (upholding the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination, finding that Ms. Marikasi’s inconsistent statements provided substantial evidence that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as inconsistent”).
463. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2018).
464. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–61.
465. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018).
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burdensome to some women asylum seekers because it places too
much focus on the asylum seeker’s ability to articulate her ac466
counts of abuse with consistency in order to establish credibility.
Trauma can have a dramatic impact on an asylum seeker’s abil467
ity to provide consistency in her statements. Asylum seekers who
have suffered intimate partner violence may also have difficulty
disclosing all information surrounding the persecution due to embarrassment, culture, language barriers, fear of retribution, or
simply a lack of understanding as to what is important to their
468
case. Under the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations must
469
consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Adjudicators may
base a credibility determination on assessments of the asylum seeker’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” “the inherent plausibility of the account,” and the consistency of the applicant’s state470
In regard to the consistency of statements, the
ments.
adjudicator assess consistency between written and oral statements,
internal consistency of statements, and the consistency of statements with other evidence in the record, and any inaccuracies or
471
falsehoods in these statements. The REAL ID Act fails to consider
how trauma stemming from abuse, or any other factors, such as
embarrassment, culture, language, fear of retribution, or lack of
472
understanding, may impact demeanor or consistency.
Inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements may increase the
473
burden on the applicant to produce corroborating evidence.
Further, even if the adjudicator finds her to be credible, she may
require further corroboration from the applicant unless the applicant can demonstrate that she “does not have the evidence and
474
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Yet, the fact that a nonstate actor inflicts the persecution in intimate partner violencebased asylum cases makes them more difficult to corroborate than
475
asylum claims involving a state actor.

466. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–61.
467. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 67; Doedens, supra
note 68, at 121–22.
468. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–62.
469. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2018).
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–62.
473. Id.
474. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2018).
475. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 43–45.
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Evidence of intimate partner violence-related persecution is dif476
ficult to gather and present given the private nature of the harm.
As discussed previously, the applicant must demonstrate that the
government is unwilling or unable to control the non-state actor.
In assessing whether this has been demonstrated, adjudicators
place significant emphasis on whether the applicant reported the
abuse to police. An applicant may provide evidence to support the
futility of reporting the abuse to the police, but such evidence is
477
difficult to obtain. Intimate partner violence-related persecution
478
may be hidden and significantly underreported in a country. As
such, country conditions reports may not be able to accurately detail the prevalence of intimate partner violence in a country and
the extent to which the state enforces any protections for victims of
479
intimate partner violence.
Second, the asylum seeker must present information about the
intimate partner violence-related persecution. There may not be
any documentation demonstrating the abuse because the asylum
seeker could not seek the help of family members or the community or seek treatment from a hospital either due to cultural reasons or fear of retribution. She may have even been prevented
480
from seeking help by others. Even assuming there are medical
records corroborating any abuse, she may not have anyone in her
481
country who can obtain them for her. Further, family members
or the community in the applicant’s country may not know of the
abuse or may fear retribution from the abuser, as well, thereby preventing them from providing affidavits supporting the applicant’s
482
testimony.
New legislation and regulations should provide that only material inconsistencies may support an adverse credibility determination; identify the types of inconsistencies that may be material to
an asylum case; incorporate the requirement of assessing how
trauma and other personal and cultural factors may impact an asylum seeker’s demeanor and her the ability to recall events and

476. Robins, supra note 36, at 462.
477. Id. at 462–63.
478. Id. at 457.
479. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 69; Bullard, supra
note 431, at 1887–88, 1896.
480. Robins, supra note 36, at 457, 462.
481. Id.
482. Id.
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provide consistency in testimony and statements. 483 The asylum
seeker should be given the opportunity to explain any material inconsistencies and present expert analysis or other evidence in support of her explanation. Inconsistencies that are not material
484
should not be considered in an assessment of credibility.
B. Training and Mechanisms for Tracking and Review of
Gender-Related Asylum Claims
New legislation and regulations addressing gender-related asylum cases alone, particularly in the context of persecution in the
form of intimate partner violence, will not provide the changes
needed to foster fair, consistent, and predictable determinations in
these cases. 485 Education and training for adjudicators are essen486
tial. In fact, judicial education and training on has been a critical
part of the improvements made in federal and state systems in the
487
treatment of intimate partner violence claims.
While training on gender issues has been, at times, compulsory
488
for asylum officers, training on gender issues—in particular intimate partner violence-based asylum claims—should be compulsory for all adjudicators of asylum claims, including immigration
489
judges, the BIA, and circuit court judges. This training should
include discussion of the gender perspective in asylum claims, the
fact that gender alone may form a particular social group, and the
types of persecution, such as intimate partner violence, that occur
490
on account of gender. Additionally, the training should address

483. Doedens, supra note 68, at 121–22 (stating that asylum law should “place the
memory loss in the context of the trauma suffered”).
484. While “material” is a subjective characterization and therefore, not ideal in a legal
landscape in which adjudicators already have too much discretion, the term is one used
throughout U.S. criminal, civil, and procedural law and, albeit imperfect, would be a significant step in the right direction.
485. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 266–68.
486. Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14, at 372–73 (asserting that new regulations cannot aid in the assessment of asylum claims made by victims of domestic violence if adjudicators do not understand the dynamics and psychology of abusive relationships).
487. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343.
488. In 1995, the Immigration and Nationality Service adopted guidelines for asylum
officers on asylum claims involving gender-related persecution. See Coven Memorandum,
supra note 69, at 17; see also USCIS Asylum Division Training Programs, USCIS,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-trainingprograms (last updated Dec. 19, 2016).
489. Barreno, supra note 47, at 265.
490. Adjudicators in asylum cases often misunderstand the reasons for intimate partner
violence. As explained by Professor Anjum Gupta,
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how gender-related persecution may support grounds for asylum
491
other than the particular social group category.
Training should also include sessions on the impact of culture,
society, economics, individual trauma, and patterns and psychology
492
of abusive relationships on asylum applicants. Understanding
these factors could affect adjudicators’ approach to credibility de493
terminations in gender-based asylum claims. Adjudicators should
further understand the common reasons behind a woman’s decision not to report abuse to the police, which may be based on
these factors along with the futility of reporting gender-based
claims in many countries, fear of retribution, and the position of
494
women before the law.
Further, the DOJ should develop a mechanism for tracking and
compiling data on the outcome of gender-related asylum claims,
including the gender-related claims that involve intimate partner
violence, in order to combat the impact of judicial bias and heavy
495
caseloads on gender-related claims. At this time, only a very small
percentage of BIA decisions are precedent, and only decisions des496
ignated as precedent are published. This transparency issue
could be combatted by creating a process for developing gender-

In asylum cases based on fear of domestic violence, immigration judges have routinely refused to find nexus to a protected ground, finding instead that the abuse
occurred because the abuser was a “despicable person,” because of his “inherent
meanness,” because of his alcohol abuse, because of his jealousy, or because of
other “personal” or “criminal” reasons. This is the case despite the fact that, in
many countries, it is clear that the vast majority of victims of domestic violence are
women.
Anjum Gupta, Dead Silent: Heuristics, Silent Motives, and Asylum, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
1, 3 (2016); see also Barreno, supra note 47, at 266 (asserting that the DHS and DOJ should
provide training to adjudicators on the nature of intimate partner violence and the claims
that arise out of this violence in order to promote consistency).
491. See Alice Edwards, Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION INT’L L. 46, 67–71 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
492. See, e.g., Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 67 (recommending that decision makers are informed of the consequences of gender-related violence, including trauma, and trained on how these consequences of violence affect an asylum seeker’s ability to give a consistent account of events); Cianciarulo & David, supra note
14, at 372–73.
493. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 67.
494. Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14, at 372–73.
495. Barreno, supra note 47, at 268.
496. Ange-Marie Hancock, When is Fear for One’s Life Race-Gendered? An Intersectional Analysis of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals’s In re A-R-C-G- Decision, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977,
2998 (2015); see also Bookey, supra note 142, at 109–10 (noting the lack of transparency resulting from the fact that many BIA decisions are not published or available on a searchable
database).
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disaggregated statistics on asylum applications and outcomes. 497
Countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden already em498
ploy this mechanism.
The data compiled could be separated into specific types of
gender-related asylum claims, including intimate partner violence.
This will allow immigration judges, the BIA, federal circuit court
judges, asylum officers, and governmental and non-governmental
organizations to assess how gender-related claims involving intimate partner violence and other forms of persecution are adjudicated. In the absence of a tracking mechanism, there is no method
for accurately assessing the impact of new legislation, regulations,
and adjudicator training on asylum claims based on gender, particularly, those involving intimate partner violence.
CONCLUSION
Matter of A-B- demonstrates that the flawed analysis, confusion,
and inconsistencies in the adjudications of asylum claims based on
intimate partner violence persist. New legislation and regulations,
combined with judicial training and a process for tracking and
compiling data on gender-based asylum claims, will provide necessary guidance to asylum adjudicators to more consistently evaluate
claims based on gender and gender-based violence.
However, the recommendations made in this Article cannot resolve all issues with the interpretation and application of the refugee definition to asylum claims involving intimate partner violence.
Even with new legislation and regulations providing direction in
asylum claims involving intimate partner violence, adjudicators
would still have some discretion in these cases. For instance, these
proposed changes would not include a finding of nexus between
the persecution and the victim’s gender as a matter of law in all
asylum claims involving intimate partner violence persecution. Nor
do these proposed changes specifically address intimate partner
violence against men or same sex partners.
Nevertheless, no progress can be made in intimate partner violence-based asylum claims without new legislation or regulations
497. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 21 (stating that all
member states should be required to provide gender-disaggregated statistical information
on asylum cases); Hancock, supra note 496, at 2998 (advocating for tracking of asylum
claims to include information on gender-based claims and other immutable and fundamental characteristics).
498. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 22.
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that recognizes that gender may form a particular social group and
provides guidance for adjudicating intimate partner violence-based
asylum claims. If adjudicators continue to consider intimate partner violence-based asylum claims without new legislation and regulations, future determinations in these cases will continue to lack
fairness, consistency, and predictability. Congress has the power
and the responsibility to provide the reforms critical for these
claims. Congress, through legislation, is able to provide the strongest and most consistent guidance in the adjudication of these
claims. Alternatively, the present administration or a new administration must provide this guidance through regulation.
Further, even with new legislation and regulations, as long as the
United States continues to adjudicate asylum cases from the perspective that intimate partner violence is a personal matter unrelated to gender, there will be little progress in protecting women
499
These perceptions can only be eradicated
asylum seekers.
through training and identifying ongoing issues in these cases,
through tracking and data compilation, so that they can be addressed. In order to demonstrate the United States’ commitment
to gender equality, our legal system must remove the impediments
to recognition of women’s asylum claims involving intimate partner violence.

499.

Gillespie, supra note 445, at 131–135.

